What is the nature and function of the boundary between insiders and outsiders in the Islamic Republic of Iran? Anyone who looks at the organization of Iranian politics will notice a fundamental distinction which guides the republic’s relations with political actors: Some are allowed to exercise political rights that others are deprived off. We see it in the emblematic screening of political candidates during parliamentary and presidential elections. We also observe it in more subtle expressions of political differentiation such as the ability to organize political parties and propagate one’s views through the media. Those who enjoy such rights are in Iran referred to as ‘insiders’ (khudi). The others, who are deprived of them, are known as ‘outsiders’ (gheir-e khudi). These are not legal terms and at no time occur in the Iranian constitution. They nonetheless refer to a fundamental parameter of politics in the Islamic Republic. The origins of the division go back to the political struggles that occurred in the wake of the 1979 revolution. The showdowns of the early revolutionary years resulted in a compartmentalization of Iran’s political forces which has turned out to be long-lasting. As hegemonic players the followers of Khomeini ruled that political power could not be bestowed on the “enemies of the Islamic Republic”. They thereby laid the ground for a regime political boundary. By this I mean a differentiation in the distribution of political rights and opportunities between insiders and outsiders of a political system. Such differentiation can be based on formal rules or informal practices or, as in the Iranian case, on a combination of both. In either way it skews the playing field in favor of the incumbents. Drawing on fieldwork in Iran, textual analysis and interviews with former regime insiders in the Iranian diaspora, this paper explores the politics of the insider-outsider-boundary from three angles; 1) the “boundary production” or ideological rationale for political exclusion; 2) reformist and conservative critiques of the regime political boundary; 3) the boundary-bending activities of political activists who challenge the compartmentalization of political groups in practice. I argue that; whereas the Iranian ruling system produces political enemies to survive its forward escape has also become a destabilizing factor.

How has the transition from authoritarian rule affected systems of interest representation in Egypt? Inspired by the literature on Latin American corporatism, this paper examines continuity and change in the structure of interest representation in Egypt following the ouster of an authoritarian regime with a long legacy of state control over workers’ representation. This paper pays particular attention to the way in which this process can create new animosities between competing groups with competing visions for the trajectory of these institutions. In this context, paper will pose three main questions: (1) What is the fate of formerly co-optative organizations following transitions from authoritarian rule?; (2) What is the nature of the struggle over these institutions, especially between new rulers, old entrenched labor elites and new labor groups; (3) What implications does this have for the survival or emergence of new types of labor groups? The post-Mubarak period has witnessed a heightened level of contestation over workers’ representation. Egypt’s new rulers continue to take steps to reconstitute the rules governing state-labor relations. In the process, however, they have clearly alienated both entrenched labor elites as well as new independent groups. In the meantime, many activists have questioned the viability and future role of the Egyptian Trade Union Federation, with some pushing for its reform and others for its disbanding. Independent labor activists, for their part, have continued to establish new organizations and to capitalize on the networks created during the Mubarak era to exchange expertise and build-up their organizational capacities. This paper traces the sources and implications of this struggle, focusing specifically on the way in which existing actors draw boundaries between insiders and outsiders, either through action or discourse. I rely primarily on interviews with labor activists and newspaper accounts. The paper will also analyze the discourse used by Egypt’s new rulers in reference to workers’ mobilization to shed some light on which actions and actors they deem appropriate and which ones they exclude and why. Examining the trajectory of workers’ organizations in Egypt has important policy and theoretical implications. From a policy perspective, it helps shed light on which actors are excluded and which ones are included in the aftermath of a transition from authoritarian rule. From a theoretical standpoint, this paper will shed light on the sources of institutional continuity and change in post-authoritarian politics and on the conditions under which old elites are replaced by new ones.

This paper examines the emergence of Sunni Muslim street mobilization in the wake of the February 14th 2011 Bahraini uprising. Drawing on social movement theory it argues that framing was pivotal in the mobilization. More specifically the paper analyses the framing processes of the Shura council members of Sahwat al-Fateh based on fieldwork conducted in Bahrain in the spring 2012. The Sunni-dominated counter-movements that emerged in reaction to the uprising did not only call for stronger government responses to the uprising and more efficient security measures, which had been the case in similar situations earlier, but also voiced political demands. Calling for political reform and an end to government corruption their message had similarities with the February 14th movement, though they also carried anti-opposition sentiments. This paper argues that the Sunni Muslims in their framing drew lines between themselves and the government, creating boundaries that shaped their political identity. Whilst the ethno-religious divide in Bahrain still separates the Sunni- and Shia- dominated movements and defines the idea of "the other" amongst great parts of the population, I find that there is a growing recognition that the interests of the Sunni government is not necessarily the same as the interests of the Sunni street. This creates a new political dynamic where the government is not necessarily able to rally and control Sunni Muslim political movements in the same way as they have previously. New youth movements emerging want to influence politics themselves and not just have their interests represented by the old political and religious authority figures. The demarcation lines in the Bahraini political landscape is changing and the members Sahwat al-Fates see themself as outsiders in Bahraini politics despite being Sunni Muslims. This can make regime survival increasingly difficult for the Bahraini government, which is used to creating support for the system by underlining cleavages along ethno-religious lines.

While post-revolutionary Libya is still in a state of flux, the post-Qadhafi phase is already witnessing the redrawing of boundaries of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the new ‘outsiders’ are those associated with the former regime. Given the nature of Qadhafi’s regime, these outsiders have tended to come from particular tribes or areas, resulting in whole towns and localities, such as Sirte or Bani Walid, feeling as though they are marginalised from the new political and economic order. These areas have also borne the brunt of revenge attacks by the new ‘insiders’, namely those revolutionaries who fought against the old regime and who have been imbued with a particular symbolic legitimacy. Drawing on insights from the literature on symbolic boundaries this paper demonstrates how these new patterns of inclusion/exclusion are being institutionalised into the emergent political system. By examining mechanisms such as the Integrity Commission, the political exclusion law and the election law, the paper shows which framing processes are being employed by Libya’s new political actors to formalise these boundaries within the nascent political arena. It also demonstrates how political choices about development and distribution of wealth and resources are further institutionalising these new lines of demarcation. Taking an empirical and qualitative approach, the research analyses legislation and decisions that have been issued by Libya’s new political bodies since the fall of the former regime, as well as statements and other literature issued by official bodies such as the Integrity Commission. It also examines literature produced by political parties and revolutionary elements, as well as by the religious establishment. The researcher moreover draws on the local media and on work by Libyan academics and commentators. The paper argues that the way in which symbolic boundaries are being redrawn and incorporated into Libya’s emergent political system is creating a new class of ‘outsiders’ and that their exclusion bodes ill for the future of the country and its transition to a modern democratic state.