Centre-Periphery Relations in Saudi Arabia: The Case of the Eastern Province Historically speaking, the relations between the central Najd region and the regions at the periphery of Saudi Arabia have been tense. The Eastern Province has been of particular concern, mainly due to the presence of the oil industry and a large Shia minority. Since 1913 and particularly since the influx of oil revenues, the Saudi state apparatus has become increasingly centralized and organized along regionalist and sectarian lines. This means that decision-making was either located with the Emir of the Eastern Province or in the central administration in Riyadh, while top posts in the local administration often went to Najdis. The Shia in particular did hardly receive high-ranking posts and their areas were sidelined through the development of the new oil and administrative towns of Khobar, Dammam and Dhahran. They were, however, recruited by ARAMCO and many were mobilized by leftist groups since the 1950s and Islamists since the 1970s. Some of these groups have voiced separatist demands and worked towards the creation of regionalist and sectarian collective identities, partially through the propagation of regionalist historical narratives. In this context, local development and regional administration have become highly contentious issues and concepts such as 'local government' or 'de-centralisation' are frowned upon in Riyadh. In recent years, however, some steps towards more local input have been taken, for example through the election of local municipal councils in 2004/5. Residents of the Eastern Province enthusiastically participated in these elections, although the actual powers of the councils are limited. Another major problem of centre-periphery relations in Saudi Arabia is the dichotomy between the formal state institutions and the semi-formal 'shadow state'. For example, many local administrative issues are formally decided by the Ministry of Municipalities and Rural Affairs (MOMRA) in Riyadh, while other decisions are made by the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Finance or the Emir's office in the Eastern Province. Contrary to residents of Najd or the Hijaz, or tribally organized residents of other regions, the largely non-tribal Shia of the Eastern Province lack integration into the Saudi shadow state and therefore into parts of the Saudi political economy. Based on fieldwork carried out in Riyadh and the Eastern Province, this paper discusses the impact of these local tensions in the Eastern region for the general questions of center-periphery relations and de-centralisation in Saudi Arabia as a whole.

In recent years, there has emerged a body of historical writings focusing on local and regional history in different parts of Iran. The local historians like all historians seek to explain what happened in these regions' past and why it happened as it did by reconstructing past events with the help of the related documents. The authors of these historical writings explicitly or implicitly challenge the existing historiography of their regions. They question the theoretical presuppositions, modes of documentation, interpretive strategies, modes of explanation through which national history has concealed historical truths about their region, and in doing so obscured the contribution of the region's past to formation of Iranian national identity. The appearance of local historiography is more obvious in the southern provinces of Khuzestan and Bousher than any other places in Iran. The local and regional historiographies define the particular historical identity of the regions and try to discover the point of convergence of the local and national identity within a new narrative of national history. These local and regional historiographical endeavors that critically evaluate the historiography of Iran in general and of the region in particular entail important epistemological and pragmatic problems to be discussed and clarified. By gathering and ranking different historical objects, as less or more important evidences in a new historical narrative these new historiographical trends like all historical writings claim to historical truth about a particular historical event, a series of events or a period. We may not be able discover the truth value of every statement in the local historigraphical accounts but their pragmatic implications can be evaluated. It is important to note that these historigraphical disputes are not only about the facts, but also about the meaning of the facts that are construed through different strategies of interpretation and ideological preferences. Like all historiographical traditions local historiography employs perfectly conventional criteria of relevance, evidence and rational inference, but they cannot hide their ideological biases. And in this way, local historiography becomes both the site of historical contestation with national historiography and an attempt to reach historical convergence with this same historiography towards a new definition of the national identity. This paper will investigate on what grounds and by whose cognitive authority can we validate or repudiate the claims of these local historiographies to historical truth, and to what extent can we reveal the relation between their historiography and their politics.

The federal state structure adopted by Iraq in the post-2003 period in many ways represents a dramatic break with past traditions of government, both nationally and regionally speaking. Since Iraq formally came into existence as a monarchy in 1921, most of the country has been ruled as a centralised state, with Kurdistan as the sole area considered eligible for any special administrative status (which it enjoyed on paper since 1974 and in a more tangible, if unrecognised way between 1991 and 2003). As for the Gulf region more broadly speaking, with the exception of the special case of the United Arab Emirates, centralist state models have been the norm. This pattern can be seen both in Iran and Saudi Arabia, both of which are big countries with complex ethno-religious make-ups where external observers often have hinted about federalism as an alternative model of government, but where the reluctance to decentralise has so far been widespread. The major shift in Iraq's state model after 2003 concerns the possibility for implementing federalism in other areas beyond Kurdistan. Kurdish regional autonomy was recognised both in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) in 2004 and in the new constitution adopted in October 2005; additionally the possibility for creating new federal entities was enabled with a three-governorate size-limit in the TAL and without limitations in the constitution. Importantly, the constitution also establishes the principle of residual powers for all provincial units, whether they are governorates or enjoy federal status. The resultant patchwork is a federation where the theoretical powers of the central government are minimal, but where the dominant powers in Baghdad have nonetheless repeatedly made determined efforts to assert their authority beyond the constitutional remit and more in line with traditional Iraqi models of centralised government. This paper looks at the history of the institution charged with policing this complex situation: The federal supreme court. Through an investigation of 63 constitutional interpretations and 92 decisions in matters concerning the relationship between federal and provincial authorities in the period 2005-2009, the study outlines how the federal supreme court has navigated in a situation where the legal framework is ambiguous and the political pressures from both domestic and external players are considerable.

The paper will focus on the evolving federation of the United Arab Emirates, charting its creation - born out of collective security - following Britain's withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971, and its survival through several constitutional crises and other breakdowns in relations between its seven constituent member emirates. A study will then be made of the relationship between the two wealthiest and most populous of these emirates: oil-rich Abu Dhabi, home to the permanent capital of the UAE; and Dubai, a historically successful regional freeport with limited oil. In particular, Dubai's efforts to retain as much autonomy as possible over its economic development path will be considered, with a special emphasis on its attempts to diversify away from oil and gas exports since the mid-1990s by building up a multi-sector economy based on foreign direct investment, export-processing free zones, tourism, and a financial sector. This paper will argue that Dubai's long term objective was really to establish itself as a de facto city state and global business hub with its own international brand, thus shielding itself from a resource-scarce future in which Abu Dhabi would seek much greater control over the UAE federation. However, following the dramatic reversal of Dubai's fortunes over the course of 2008 and 2009, it will be shown how the failings of Dubai's foreign direct investment-reliant model and its accumulation of significant short term debts have left its rulers with little option but to seek assistance from Abu Dhabi. With a cautious bailout programme underway, Abu Dhabi will gradually rein in Dubai's autonomous economic planning, especially if it is deemed to have damaged the UAE's international credibility, and in time the federation is likely to enjoy greater political centralization as Dubai's government is starved of the resources it needs to perform the duties that can be taken over by federal ministries. Finally, although often overlooked in both academic and media outputs, the paper will consider the future of the five poorer emirates and their likely role in the evolving federation. In recent years their share of contributions to the UAE's overall GDP has fallen and their number of seats on the federal council of ministers has shrunk. Moreover, with the bulk of employment opportunities being created in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, many citizens of poorer emirates are obliged to commute long distances and have effectively become migrant workers within their own federation.