The relative weight and interaction of structural and cultural factors remains a central preoccupation of international relations theory today. This is particularly evident in the recent surge of interest in contemporary Islamic conceptions of conflict and cooperation. This paper explores the state of the field through an investigation of what may be described as the "reformist" school of Islamic thought on international affairs, represented by modern scholars such as Muhammad Shaltut, Muhammad Abu Zahra, `Abd al-Khaliq al-Nawawi, and Wahba al-Zuhayli. First, the paper will clarify the contrasts between this reformist school and what is often called the "classical doctrine" – originating with the jurists of the `Abbasid period – on critical questions such as the legitimacy of offensive (as opposed to defensive) war, and the extent of permissible cooperation with non-Muslim polities. Second, the paper will explore the conceptual underpinnings of such contrasts, including the reformist emphasis on historicism (the notion that much of the classical doctrine reflected transient historical exigencies that may be abrogated); its reliance on the well-being of the community/polity as the ultimate standard for conduct in international affairs; its consequent privileging of state sovereignty; and its overall conclusion that peace is the basis of a true Islamic understanding of international politics. Finally, the paper will assess the strengths and weaknesses of the reformist approach through a comparison with an alternative approach developed in the medieval period – one represented by figures such as the author of the early `Abbasid treatise Mukhtasar Siyasat al-Hurub, and Ibn Khaldun. This comparison will suggest that the modern reformist school has yet to refine its ideas on certain core tensions between religion and realpolitik in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy, particularly on the question of imperialism. My sources are the primary texts on international politics of the representative figures of the three approaches mentioned here: the reformist, the classical, and the "Ibn Khaldunian."

An examination of popular advice literature geared toward Muslims living in the West, such as the type commonly available in U.S. mosques and at online Islamic bookstores, indicates that there are at least two potentially conflicting narratives regarding the hijab (the veil or headcovering) as a pious practice. The first narrative presents female sexuality as a natural and positive force, as long as it is properly channeled. The hijab, in this narrative, is not meant to categorically repress women’s erotic nature, but is a pragmatic social practice meant to avoid eroticism in the public sphere, where it would be a source of temptation and disorder. Often corresponding to this narrative is a notion of (female) sexuality as static, or “springy,” and an ideology that deemphasizes the social significance of sexual differences. A second narrative presents erotic desire and fulfillment as a marker of attachment to the world and an assertion of the ego-self (nafs), and therefore negative, even in the context of marriage. In this view, the hijab is an ascetic practice, a means by which a woman may discipline her self and develop a greater spiritual-moral faculty. This narrative, in many instances, considers (female) sexuality as malleable, and also tends to be paired with an emphasis on sexual difference. These two approaches to eroticism are at cross-purposes, even if they are both utilized to support the same end, which is a call for women to practice the hijab. The first objective of this paper is to tease out the conflicting models of sexuality that emerge in this genre of writing. Often one finds, however, that both models are deployed in the same work. The second objective of this paper, therefore, is to examine how authors who draw on both narratives seek to reconcile them. I will conclude with thoughts on the potential impact of such an ambiguous portrayal of sexuality on contemporary Muslim discourses and practices concerning the hijab as well as the relationship between eroticism and virtue.

In the veritable academic quest for a more capacious hermeneutical view on fundamentalisms, the comparative method appears to be one of the most employed theoretical instruments. A particular refinement of the comparative approach to fundamentalism places together religious fundamentalisms and totalitarian ideologies of the twentieth century in what might be called the comparativism across the secular-religious divide. In this context, the Italian Fascism and German National-Socialism are compared-almost exclusively and clearly not coincidentally- with the Islamic Fundamentalism in order to demonstrate that a more than accidental resemblance is at play. In some cases, this particular reading of totalitarianism and fundamentalism as two faces of the same coin, gradually abandons the ideal of a more nuanced methodological reflection based on scientific neutrality, and takes the form of hybrid concepts such as Islamofascism. My paper attempts to deconstruct the concept of Islamofascism by comparing two discursive orders produced by Islamic Fundamentalism and by the interwar European Extreme Right, via the concept of political mythology. Narrowing the perspective, I intend to compare the fundamental texts of the Egyptian Islamic Brotherhood and of Romanian Legion of the Archangel Michael by employing as explanatory framework the four political mythologies coined by the French historian Raoul Girardet: Unity, Conspiracy, The Golden Age and The Savior. My hypothesis cam be summarized as follows: as imaginative acts of world creation, political mythologies are structures of meaning which allow a comparative approach that keeps open the tension between similarity and difference and broad ranging cross boundary comparisons gain systematic value without falling into the trap of rigid taxonomies. Since political mythologies and ideological constructions are intrinsically connected, I will argue that the concept of myth could provide an important point of access to the challenging radical forma mentis of both Fundamentalisms and radicalisms. I seek to demonstrate that despite an apparent structure of similarities, fundamentalism of the Islamic Brotherhood the radicalism of the Romanian Extreme Right appear in the light of political mythologies as bearing features that differ markedly in more than one aspect. The mythological constellation formed by Unity, Conspiracy, The Golden Age and The Savior is cast in different types of rhetorical strategy, and definitional structures. I will argue that this difference will radically question the applicability of Islamofascism as analytical category within a universalizing and archetypal type of comparativism.