Of all Arab countries, Jordan is usually one of the least discussed in the media as well as in academia and the impact the Arab Spring has had on the country only seems to confirm this. This is particularly so, perhaps, with regard to political Salafism in Jordan, which – judging by how often it is dealt with by both journalists and scholars - seems to be almost non-existent. Jordan nevertheless has its very own tradition of Salafism, a small part of which can be labelled “reformist” – a broad term used for those Jordanian Salafis who seek a middle way between the sole focus on doctrinal purity and education of quietist, a-political Salafis and the radicalism and use of violence of the country’s Jihadi-Salafi trend. This paper discusses the development of this more political Salafism in Jordan and how the Arab Spring has had an impact on this phenomenon. It traces the history of political discourse and activism among Salafis in Jordan back to transnational trends coming from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s on the one hand and increased politicisation among local Islamic movements after the Gulf War on the other. The paper shows how the Jordanian context has gradually become more hostile towards political Salafism, both because of the state’s increasingly sceptical attitude towards political Islam in general and because of quietists Salafis’ growing vehemence in their rejection of alternative Salafi trends. Special attention will be paid to what may be described as the standard bearer of “reformist” Salafism in Jordan, the Jam‘iyyat al-Kitab wa-l-Sunna. Based on an extensive reading of Jordanian political Salafis’ own publications as well as fieldwork among adherents to this trend of “reformist” Salafism conducted in 2012 and 2013, this paper argues that the Arab Spring – and particularly the Salafi parties that came into existence as a result – has had a dual effect on political Salafism in Jordan: while it has undoubtedly served as a source of inspiration for the country’s political Salafis, it has simultaneously increased the weariness of this trend among both state officials and Jordan’s quietist Salafis. As such, this paper argues that, whereas the Arab Spring seems to have stimulated Salafi groups to integrate politically in countries whose regimes have been overthrown, it has so far increased pressure on like-minded Jordanians to refrain from doing the same.

Salafism has existed in Egypt for most of the 20th century, eventually becoming an influential social force after the 1970s. The majority of Egyptian Salafis, however, first avoided any involvement in politics, and were heavily critical of the Muslim Brotherhood for taking part in the democratic facade of the Mubarak years. The 25 January 2011 revolution changed the picture completely: from March 2011, Salafis started announcing the creation of political parties - seven of them until this day. The biggest and most successful of all turned out to be the Nour party, which was founded by the country's most powerful Salafi religious organization: the Salafi call (al-da'wa al-salafiyya) of Alexandria. During the parliamentary elections of late 2011-early 2012, the coalition led by the Nour party gained about 25% of the seats in both the majlis al-sha'b and the majlis al-shura (i.e. the two houses of Egypt's parliament). The integration of Salafis to the political sphere sparked extremely lively debates among Salafi sympathizers and ideologues about the legitimate means and aims of politics in the open context of the post-revolution era. I will argue that one can ideal-typically distinguish three groups with distinct positions on those debates: the “sheikhs”, who argue that Salafis should not practice politics for the sake of politics, and that the Nour party should be no more than a pressure group in the political sphere to defend the interests of the Salafi call; the “politicians”, who are ready to fully embrace the logic of politics, even if this means accepting to compromise with the Salafi doctrine; and the “revolutionaries”, who prefer street politics to parliamentary politics, and blame the established Salafi parties for not pushing hard enough for the implementation of the Sharia. In this context, I will analyze the split that happened in the Nour party in December 2012, as a result of which the Salafi “politicians” left to establish a new party called the Watan (“Homeland”) party, which claims to be “a party for all Egyptians” and not only for Salafis, and openly asserts its independence from Salafi sheikhs.

While debates on politicization have structured much of the Salafi movement in Yemen since the 1990s, the revolutionary process launched in early 2011 appears to have acted as an accelerator of politicization. The toppling of 'Alî 'Abd Allâh Salih, who had managed to intrumentalize the various trends of Salafism, undeniably favored new dynamics within the Islamist field. The consequent establishment of openly Salafi political parties, like the Rashad Union, now appears to act as a sign of the normalization of Salafism through its integration in politics. This “new” trend of Salafism aims to emerge as a possible alternative to the Muslim Brothers who currently dominate the Islah party. Through such a process, large segments of the Salafi realm have clarified their stance regarding participation to elections but also for instance the use of television as a means of political communication. Emerging figures of Salafism have been eager to participate in political debates, including the “National dialogue”, and have tried to create a new doctrine. However, the process appears to be incomplete and triggers much resistance and criticism on the part of quietist, as well as so-called jihadi, Salafi trends but also of Muslim Brothers. The new politicized branch of Salafism in Yemen also appears to be fragmented, along mostly regional lines and to be symbolically caught up (much like the rest of Yemen's political actors) in the many conflicts of Yemen, be it in the Sa'da region, in the South or in the fight against armed Islamist movements more or less linked to al-Qâ'ida. As a consequence, no charismatic leadership has yet emerged among the Salafis able to compete with Muqbil al-Wâdi'î who passed away more than a decade ago. As such, the politicization process may no be as successful as it has been in Egypt nor even appear as sustainable. This paper intends to analyze the various debates that are occurring within Salafism in Yemen and their connection to dynamics taking place at the regional level. The paper will also look precisely into the evolving modes of mobilization within the politicized branch of Salafism that appear to be a legacy of the revolutionary process launched by the “shabâb”.

Tunisia, long perceived as an oasis of moderation in the MENA region, experienced a surge in Salafi mobilization following the 2011 revolution. Many observers have been surprised by the dramatic emergence and ubiquity of Tunisian Salafism, since Salafi trends-- although present in Tunisia since the 1980s-- remained mostly underground before the revolution. Intense media coverage of the "Salafi threat" has placed pressure on policy analysts to rapidly ascertain the movement's composition, often resulting in single-factor, reductionist explanations of Salafis' motivations (such as the assumption that Salafis become Salafis simply because they are poor). Such pressure has resulted in a glut of surface-level misinformation, with comparatively little space left for nuanced analyses based on in-depth field interviews with Salafis themselves. While Tunisia's Salafis share certain goals, they are diverse and largely disorganized. This paper shines light on the most salient difference separating Tunisia's Salafi trends-- the matter of age and generational politics. While Tunisia's older Salafis have tended to identify with more traditional forms of quietist practice ("jihad of the heart") or have waded gingerly into the realm of party politics, Tunisia's young people-- who comprise the fastest-growing demographic of self-described Salafis-- identify heavily with the Salafi jihadi movement, which they describe as more assertive and more activism-oriented (jihad al-haraka as opposed to jihad al-qalb). Jihadi Salafis echo Tunisian youths' general frustrations with hypocrisy, heavily centralized state power, and an older generation of political actors perceived as largely incompetent and neglectful. However, they go much farther than their peers by rejecting the party system almost entirely and setting up a religiously informed subculture in its place. From donning atypical, sometimes rebellious forms of religiously conservative dress to propping up new twenty-something "sheikhs" in local mosques, young jihadi Salafis are impacting the social scene and staging their own, more organic forms of transitional justice. They represent an important but misunderstood minority in Tunisian society. This paper is based on nearly two years' worth of ethnographic field interviews with a group of 18 Salafi young people. It emphasizes the alternative lifestyle aspect of jihadi Salafism, and explores the causes for young Salafis' antipathy to party political integration. The paper also focuses on the relationship between young Salafis and Tunisia's much-beleaguered security sector, which has been the topic of intense rumour and scrutiny over the past two years.