Umayyad studies are well established in modern scholarship, but the vexing source problems that affect any research on this period mean that many fundamental aspects of Umayyad rule remain poorly understood. Indeed, as it is well known, documentary evidences for early Islam are scarce while, from the strict perspective of Muslim narratives, the first dynasty of Islam is only documented by much later sources, mostly produced in Abbasid Iraq from the 9th century onwards. If early generation of scholars readily relied on these narratives to write Umayyad history, the rise of historiography generated questions regarding the use of these texts. Scholars adopted a variety of responses to face the challenge of the sources, ranging from source-criticism to radical skeptical approaches. Yet it seems increasingly clear that the Umayyads%u2019 practical exercise of power and the ideology and institutions of government they created laid the foundations for the practices of later Islamic dynasties and for later Islamic political theory%u2014even if later sources attempt to disguise this important legacy. This profound and long-lasting heritage on the Caliphate deserves scrutiny.<br>
The papers on this panel will address different aspects of the methods of government, the conception of power, as well as the daily practice of power initiated and developed by the Umayyad caliphs of Damascus and carried out by their governors, drawing on specific examples from both the Sufyanid and the Marwanid periods of Umayyad rule. Among the crucial questions to be considered are succession policies, political networks and the spatial exercise of power, the elaboration of a Muslim identity as a component of Umayyad rule, and the creation of a dynastic ideology. <br>
These studies will help to overcome the anti-Umayyad perceptions of many later literary sources, written during the Abbasid period. They should also help in some measure to counterbalance the over-dependency in previous scholarship on the testimony of the Arabic papyri, which though of inestimable value as truly documentary sources, offer a picture rooted in only one province, Egypt (perhaps best exemplified by the letters of the famous governor Qurra b. Shar%u012Bk), that may not have been fully representative of conditions and practices in the Umayyad caliphate. Other areas, notably like Syria, indeed the Umayyad heartland, Iraq, or Central Asia were much more neglected %u2013 despite some important studies %u2013 and deserve more attention.
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Dr. Khaled Keshk
Who appointed Yaz?d I as Caliph?
Yaz?d b. Mu??wiya (r. 680-683) is one of the most if not the most controversial figures in early Islamic history. His name has become synonymous with impiety, authoritarianism, illegitimacy, and as the touchstone of the devolvement of the Caliphate into ‘Kingship.’ Yaz?d’s father, Mu??wiya b. Ab? Sufy?n (r. 657-680), is seen as being the architect of the above devolvement. Much of our information about both comes to us from later more hostile times to both these characters and the Umayyads; here we are of course talking about the extant literary sources that were written more than a century after the above incidents, albeit the purport to be using contemporary source to these incidents. Many scholars have used these sources in order to try get at the reasons behind Mu??wiya’s appointment of his own son rather than explain why there is a problem in the first place; meaning, and this what this paper will address, did Mu??wiya really appoint his son? Was there a problem with the legitimacy of Yaz?d or with his authority? If we approach these sources differently by asking the above questions would they start to make more sense? The paper will show that the sources were trying to explain the second fitnah using language and terminology that was more comprehensible to their contemporaries which creates the usual confusion that is endemic to these sources. To do this the paper will address two issues: The first is the notion that Mu??wiya was setting a precedent, and the second, and most important, that the nature and the reason of the opposition to Yaz?d. The paper will show that Mu??wiya, if he even appointed his son as heir apparent, was not setting a precedent and that these accounts are to be apprehended as attempts of regional and political actors at understanding their acceptance of the appointment of Yaz?d as heir apparent.
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Antoine Borrut
This paper focuses on some of the practical conditions of the Marwanid restoration of power in the aftermath of the second fitna and argues for the practice of an itinerant kingship initiated by ?Abd al-Malik in Syria. It then follows the evolution of this mode of government all through the Umayyad period, until the eventual demise of the dynasty.
The methodology adopted aims to confront the limited textual evidences to archaeological and epigraphical data.
The main argument proposed here is that Umayyad desert castles were primarily connected with an itinerant practice of power, even if most of the other functions proposed by the various theories regarding these sites might occasionally be true. Such a practice was first developed by ?Abd al-Malik, as part of his effort to reaffirm his control over Syria. But as it was impossible for him to move throughout the whole province, he delegated caliphal mobility to the Marwanid princes. This decision in turn led to an important ‘territorialization’ of Syrian space. In the course of the Marwanid period, as mobility was entrusted to the princes, the caliph was more and more able to settle in a privileged residence as best exemplified by Hish?m. He was very likely a prince in motion but he became a very static caliph, based in al-Ru??fa. This rapid evolution of the system had important consequences. Mobility becomes slowly the privilege of princes, and more and more of princes at war, like Maslama b. ?Abd al-Malik, in the last phase of the Umayyad Jihad State.
The failure of itinerant kingship, a model of government promoted by ?Abd al-Malik in the context of the Marwanid restoration (maybe, in fact, more by necessity than by choice) was also the failure of the Umayyad dynasty, even if such a system was used anew by the first Abbasids. The delegated mobility was finally confiscated. Itinerant power passed from the caliphs to “prince-soldiers” and later (under the Abbasids) to soldiers, resulting in the confiscation of mobility and to the immobile caliphate.
The Umayyad desert castles were slowly abandoned in Abbasid times; as their function was ephemeral, so was their occupation. But the legacy of itinerant kingship is perhaps the most visible heritage of the first dynasty of Islam. Like their huge project of building mosques in every major city, their policy of itinerant kingship contributed, to the making of a caliphal landscape.
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Dr. Mark D. Luce
“Asad b. ?Abdull?h al-Qasr?: the Restorer of Umayyad Khur?s?n”
The Umayyads in Khur?s?n encountered a variety of challenges over an eighty-year
period. Toward the end of Umayyad power, in 117/725, when Asad b. ?Abdull?h al-
Qasr? arrived in Khur?s?n for the second time, Umayyad authority extended only over
Marw and N?sh?p?r due to the rebellion of ??rith b. Surayj. It was only because of
Asad’s superior abilities as a commander and administrator that Umayyad authority was
restored throughout Khur?s?n. H.A.R. Gibb in his Arab Conquests in Central Asia
credits Asad with re-establishing Umayyad authority and reorganizing the province so
that order could be restored.
The thesis of this paper is that Umayyad Khur?s?n needed to be governed by a neutral
outside administrator in tune with its people and willing to commit to the region. The
crisis in Khur?s?n inherited by Asad was caused by a combination of reasons: its severed
administrative links with Iraq, the rapid turnover of a series of weak outsider governors
with no knowledge of Khur?s?n who installed their own sets of provincial officials, no
attempt to maintain balanced governance by addressing the grievances of all Khur?s?n?s,
Arab and non-Arab, and a costly and continual policy of expansion that did nothing to
benefit the Khur?s?n?s.
This paper will briefly describe previous successful patterns of governance in Khur?s?n
and then explain how the situation had deteriorated to the point that it had prior to Asad’s
governorships (106-109/724-727 and 117-120/735-738). The paper discusses the special
conditions that existed in Khur?s?n before and during Asad’s rule and the problems that
Asad had to be overcome in order to restore Umayyad authority. Attention will be paid
to why Asad’s actions were successful by demonstrating his approach to the above
mentioned shortcomings, enabling him to re-establish firm Umayyad authority in
Khur?s?n. Additionally, it will be shown that after Asad died in Khur?s?n in 120/738,
that the lack of tribal impartiality in governance and the lack of administrative support
from Iraq, accelerated political dissention within the Khur?s?n? Muslim community and
led to the erosion of authority and the loss of control there. The paper utilizes all
available original sources and takes into consideration the entire period of Umayyad
governance in Khur?s?n.
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Dr. Abdulhadi Alajmi
Al-Wal?d II and the new Umayyad Propaganda.
There have been a number of pivotal moments in Umayyad history that not only had a profound effect specifically on the dynasty but also on Islamic history in general. Such was the case with regards to the reign of al-Wal?d II Ir. 743-744). But because of the heavy reliance on literary sources that were written more than a century after these incidents the historian spends more time trying to decipher the meaning behind these statements rather than the actually history of these incidents. But from time to time one gets lucky and finds a document that, for all intensive purposes, most likely goes back to the Umayyad it purportedly was authored by; this is in reference to al-Wal?d II’s letter in which he talks about the designation of his successors. These letters have been utilized by many scholars as a good source for the understanding of Umayyad legitimacy. That is, many scholars have seen that these letters reflect the Umayyad understanding of their legitimacy. They are not only a reflection of al-Wal?d II but of his predecessors’ arguments for their right to rule the Islamic community. This paper will show that in fact this was the exact opposite, that rather than being a reflection of the Umayyad understanding of their legitimacy this letter deviates sharply from the Umayyad ‘propaganda’ vis-à-vis their understanding of their authority and leadership. It will also be shown that al-Wal?d II had to resort to deviated from the old Umayyad understanding of authority and legitimacy because of the actions of his uncle Hish?m (r. 724-743) whose attacks on al-Wal?d, while he was heir apparent, eroded any possibility for al-Wal?d to anchor his claims in Umayyad propaganda. Instead al-Wal?d had to deviate quite sharply from Umayyad claims which resulted in the further erosion in what little was left of Umayyad legitimacy.
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Dr. Fred M. Donner
One facet of the rapid expansion of the community of Believers during the first century and a half AH was the development of a wide range of institutions and practices of government. Although literary sources of later date (mostly from the later second, the third, and the fourth centuries AH) offer some hints about the nature of these institutions and practices as early as the first decades following Muhammad’s death in 632 CE, most of these institutions and practices only begin to become clearly visible during the period of rule by the Umayyad dynasty (661-750 CE).
The limited documentary evidence, coupled with the later literary evidence, suggests that during the Umayyad period, an effort was made to rename institutions and practices central to the operation of the state using terminology drawn from the Qur’an—a process we can call “Qur’anicization.” The goal of this process was to legitimate the Umayyad state and government by linking them with the divine revelation and the person of the prophet—in effect, to “Islamicize” the state. The best-known example of this process of Qur’anicization involves the term used for the head of state. Every known document (inscription, papyrus, tiraz fabric, coin) for the early Umayyad period refers to the head of state as amir al-mu’minin, “commander of the Believers,” a title that reflects clearly the ruler’s position as commander of the community, and the community’s self-conception as a community of Believers. Beginning with ‘Abd al-Malik (r. 685-705 CE), however, there appear documents (in particular, coins) referring to him using the somewhat obscure Qur’anic term khalifa (“caliph”). Presumably, the older term amir al-mu’minin, although well known and perfectly descriptive, was considered inadequate because it was not found in the Qur’an. This process of “Qur’anicizing” crucial terms seems to have been Umayyad policy, for a similar process can be traced for a number of other institutions and practices. They reveal the Umayyads’ concern with establishing the legitimacy of the Muslim community as the heirs of the prophet Muhammad and guardians of God’s revelation, and also their concern to establishing their own legitimacy as rulers of the Muslim community. In so doing, the Umayyads did much to establish—for their own age and for all subsequent ones—just what “Islam” and “Muslim” meant.
