Especially after the end of the Cold War, most of the scholars, focusing on Turkish foreign policy have tried to figure out whether there is continuity or change in basic principles, objectives, priorities and international orientation of Turkish foreign policy. Scholars such as Philip Robins, William Hale have argued that Turkish foreign policy changed profoundly after the cold war, sampling their argument with the case of 1990-91 Gulf War. However, on the other side, some other scholars insisted that Turkish foreign policy did not deviate from its traditional orientation in the post-cold war era. Both of the sides have analyzed change and continuity in Turkish foreign policy by referring Turkey’s regional role in the new era, her changing geostrategic importance in the post-cold war era, and her responsiveness to external environment. There remains the puzzle. Most of these studies ignore the role of decision-makers, who involve foreign policymaking process actively. In that regard, this research paper is an attempt to analyze the role of decision-makers in Turkish foreign policymaking in the cases of 1990-1991 Gulf War and 2003 Iraqi War. In the former one, former Turkish President Turgut Ozal seemed to take a leading role and joined the international coalition and in the latter one, Prime Minister and leader of Justice and Development Party (AKP) Tayyip Erdogan seemed to say the last word on remaining neutral.Since there is a debate over the role of foreign policy formers in both cases, there is not much systematic analysis referring to the role of the decision-making bodies in Turkish foreign policymaking. The questions of this paper lie at the heart of this puzzle: Do decision makers really influence Turkish foreign policymaking? If so, how do they affect decision-making process? Does the influence of leaders in foreign policymaking cause a drastic change in traditional principles of foreign policy? Are these decision units form a compact group or is there a split between them? In order to answer all these questions, I will adopt Hermann’s decision-unit framework and test whether decision units affect/cause a drastic change in Turkish foreign policy principles in both cases by surveying related news coverage, speeches, official documents, interviews as well as secondary resources.

This paper assesses the long-term consequences of the economic and financial rise of the United Arab Emirates and Qatar for the international relations of the Persian Gulf region and the Middle East at large. Despite the appearance in recent years of a number of studies dealing with various aspects of Persian Gulf politics, there have not been any systematic, in-depth studies of the regional and larger international consequences of the emergence of Qatar and the UAE as financial and economic powerhouses for both their neighboring states in the Persian Gulf and also for other actors in the Middle East. This paper looks precisely at such a linkage. What, if any, the research asks, are the regional and international consequences of the rise of Qatar and the UAE for the evolving international relations of the Persian Gulf? Are we witnessing the rise of economically self-confident small states that are eager to proactively engage in big power politics? Does this foretell a steady overshadowing of—or at least spirited competition to—the regional diplomatic clout of such traditional powerhouses as Iran and Saudi Arabia? More broadly, are Qatar and the UAE beneficiaries of a qualitatively new form of power rooted in their penetration of and strength in global financial markets? In sum, the paper asks, are these changes ephemeral or do they amount to a more profound, longer-term transformation of the regional balance of power in the Persian Gulf?

Shortly after his enthronement, King Hassan II of Morocco (1961-1999) redirected his country foreign policy from a neutralist stance opted for by his father, Muhammad V (1956-1961), towards a definite pro-Western orientation. Abdelkhalek Berramdane has explained this policy change based on the rise of a revolutionary socialist Algeria and its ensuing border conflict with Morocco, the so called “The Sand War” (1963). Although this argument is still valid, as these were definitely crucial factors, Morocco´s relations with the West at that time, especially with the United States, were not devoid of difficulties. To study the evolution of Hassan II´s early years foreign policy and his relations with the United States, this paper will analyze the role played by Kennedy’s administration during the regional conflict of 1963. This was the first open armed conflict between Morocco and Algeria over their Saharan frontier. This research work is part of a Ph.D. dissertation research based upon diplomatic documentation from the American, British, French, and Spanish governments. It will explain the objectives and the limitations of U.S. foreign policy making process toward this border war. First, it will examine the U.S. approach as it became concerned about the risk of internationalization of the conflict – it received special attention from the White House as soon as it became connected with Middle East events through the presence in Algerian territory of Egyptian military personnel sent by Gamal Abdel Nasser, and with Latin America via the military assistance provided by Cuba. Second, this work’s findings will prove that the U.S. pressed for a mediated solution, instead of executing a policy of unconditional support for Morocco, as some have argued. Finally, the paper will asses the consequences for the region´s future stability. It will be argued that the Kennedy administration succeeded in putting pressure for a cease fire that was finally agreed upon in Bamako (Mali). This agreement, however, failed to curtail the arms race that eventually ensued and which has deepened since then the regional rivalry between Algeria and Morocco. Tensions over the Sahara would reappear from 1975 on when Spain abandoned the Western Sahara in favor of Morocco and Mauritania, and they still poison the political, economical and social development of North Africa.

Coming on the heel of the Tanzimat-era, Sultan Abdülhamid II recognized the urgent need to modify the policies that instead of achieving cohesiveness by appealing to the loyalty of the non-Muslim population had ignited tensions among the Muslim population. With this impetus, AbdülhamidII targeted the Arab provinces and the Arab frontier regions, home to the highest proportion of Sunni Muslims in the empire and the two holy cities in Islam – Mecca and Medina. New forms of tying the Ottoman state to its distant and important frontiers were infrastructural projects which sought to tie Istanbul, physically and politically to the southern provinces were the Hijaz telegraph line (completed in 1901) and the Hijaz railroad (completed in 1908). To ensure the success of these projects – logistically difficult and heavily dependant on local resources and support – the Hamidian administration relied on the negotiation skills of loyal, multilingual, highly educated Ottoman officials. One such official was Sadiq al-Mu’ayyad al-‘Azm, a Damascene-Ottoman based in Istanbul who worked on both projects, most importantly, leading the extension of the telegraph line from Damascus to Medina. As part of a bigger project aimed at understanding the experience of the understudied role that Ottoman-Arab officials such as Al-Azm played in these crucial projects, in this paper I will reverse the angle of analysis in order to explore the role tribes from all over the Arabian Peninsula played in facilitating, hindering, guarding and destroying of the telegraph line during the process of construction and operation at the turn of the century. I will attempt to understand the socio-political dynamic of this negotiation from the perspective of the Ottoman state and the various local tribes. I will do this through an analysis of the records collected from the Ottoman archives in Istanbul, contemporary Ottoman and Arabic newspapers, as well as a variety of travelogues and records found in Riyadh, Jeddah, and Damascus. My primary aim is to contribute to emerging literature that looks at tribal forces in the Arabian peninsula as agents of history, often determining the path that the Ottoman policies. This influence on Ottoman international and domestic policies took on a much wider dimension due to the geopolitical significance of the Southern Arabian Peninsula especially in relation to emerging European colonial interests in the region and the symbolic significance of this holy land for the Muslim world.