This paper criticizes the thesis that Shia Islam was the ultimate cause of the Iranian revolution. Numerous theories have been proposed to account for the Iranian revolution of 1979. The “cultural explanation” points to the Shah’s alleged alienation of the Shi’ite religious establishment and his supposed opposition to Shia Islam. Those who blame Shia Islam for the revolution highlight Muhammad Pahlavi’s alleged promotion of pre-Islamic Persian identity over Shia Islam as a source of his alienation of the Iranian population. Prominent scholar of Iran, Charles Kurzman, in his book The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran, discusses various explanations for the Iranian revolution. In his analysis of the cultural explanation of the revolution, he states that both Western and Soviet observers drew attention to Iran’s 90% Shia population. Many commentators, given the zeal of Khomeini and his fellow revolutionaries, believed that Shia Islam is inherently a revolutionary faith. Certainly, Ali Sharaiti and Ruhollah Khomeini both advanced this thesis. Hamid Dabashi in his book Shi’ism: A Religion of Protest argues that Shia Islam is inherently revolutionary, inheriting a revolutionary tradition from Imam Hussein’s sacrifice at Karbala. Three essential dimensions will be explored: The theological contradictions between classical Shia theology and the philosophy of Ayatollah Khomeini, Ali Sharaiti, and other revolutionary thinkers; the imbedded link between Iranian identity and Shia Islam; and the Shah’s own religious policies. Attention will be paid to the clergy who were antagonistic towards the ideals of the Iranian revolution, such as the late Hojjatiyeh society. These interlocking features shall demonstrate that it was not Shia Islam which allowed for the Iranian revolution. When one understands that Khomeini’s ideas were alien to classical interpretations of Shi’ism, that Iranian identity had for several centuries been interlocked with Shia Islam, and the Shah himself aggressively promoted Shia Islam, it will be made apparent that the cultural explanation is without substance. The writings of early prominent Shia theologians, jurists, and hadith collectors are quite contrary to the revolutionary rhetoric of Khomeini and Shariati. Whatever it was that motivated the Iranian revolutionaries and ultimately resulted in the dissolution of the Pahlavi monarchy, it was not an innate revolutionary spirit imbued within Shia Islam from its inception.

The Shī’ī seminary is generally known as a religious institution with an emphasis on teaching the Islamic sciences and, in particular, Islamic law (fiqh). Within this scope, the seminary aims to prepare jurists (mujtahids). We also know that the post-Safavid inclination of the Shī’ī seminaries has been officially dominated by opponents of Sufism. The accounts of these hostilities have been narrated and documented. Yet, there are Sufi orders that continue to develop their ideas and practices in those seminaries. In what follows, the Sufi chain and teachings of Shaykh Muḥammad Bahārī (1265/1849 - 1325/1907) will be studied. Shaykh Muḥammad Bahārī, aside from being a mujtahid, was a scholar and follower of Sufism. He was a disciple of Mullā Ḥusayn-Qulī Hamadānī (1239/1824-1311/ 1894) in “‘irfān” in the Shī’ī seminary. In his treatise on spiritual wayfaring, Tadhkirah al-Muttaqīn, Bahārī represents a triad of jurisprudence (fiqh), ethics (akhlāq) and monotheism (tawhīd). In his terms, fiqh is an introduction to ʿamal (practice), practice is an introduction to the refinement of character (tahdhīb akhlāq), and akhlāq is an initial step to tawḥīd (the assertion of God’s unity). He, However, lived during the Iranian Constitutional Revolution but never addressed the relationship between state and power. He advised his followers to avoid engaging with power or leadership, and to take a Sufi path of renouncement. This paper examines the intersection of Shī’ī and Sufi spiritual movements within the Shī’ī seminary. It demonstrates that Bahārī sought to reframe Sufi/mystical thought to present it as more acceptable to the Shī’ī seminary, which was characterized by rigid interpretations of Islamic law. This paper also studies the development of the Ẕahabiyya esoteric school within the Shī’ī seminary by tracing the Sufi chain of Bahārī and his masters.

During the fifteenth century, relying on the Qizilbāsh, Shāh Ismāʿīl I established the Safavid empire (1501-1736 CE) in Iran. He claimed that the official religion of his state would be Twelver Shiʿism even though a majority of the population at that time was Sunnī Muslim. Additionally, most of the Shīʿīʿulamāʾ (religious scholars) had immigrated to other countries such as Jabal ʿA ̅mil in Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, and Iraq because of the harsh policies imposed by the previous government. To fulfil his claim, Shāh Ismāʿīl I started to destroy anything related to Sunnī Islam, including the mosques, institutions, and theological schools, and he began to persecute those who did not convert to Shīʿī Islam. More importantly, Safavid rulers, invited renowned Twelver Shīʿī ʿulamāʾ from Arabic-speaking areas, particularly Jabal ʿA ̅mil, to reinforce the Shīʿīʿulamāʾ already in Iran. These Shīʿī ʿulamāʾ especially ʿĀmilīs (the religious scholars ), were assigned to very important administrative positions by the rulers, and they cooperated with the government in different positions. This paper reviews all the administrative positions given to Shīʿī ʿulamāʾ by the Safavid rulers by synthesizing mostly European visitors’ travelogues about Iran from this period. It also explains the Shīʿī ʿulamā’s responsibilities, their duties, the degree of their authority, and the importance of their political positions in order to understand how influential they were, or consequently, how influenced the state was by religion in the Safavid dynasty. Even though neither the Shīʿī ʿulamā in general nor the ʿĀmilīs, in particular, were involved in the formation of the Safavid empire, their foreign origin and thus their dependence on the state guaranteed their loyalty and made them a counterweight to the powerful Qizilbash families. There are two types of official titles forʿulamāʾ in the Safavid empire. The first category consists of official titles for administrative-political positions related to the government, such as Ṣadr, Shaykh al-Islam, Qāḍī, Wakīl al-Ḥalālīya, and Mullābāshī. The second category includes the titles of positions that were not administrative-political in nature but still related to the government. Mujtahid-e Zamān, Muftī, Pishnamāz, Mudarris, Khādimī, and Mufassir belong to the second category. It is also seen that the process of appointing ‘ulamā’ and the rank of the positions, compared with each other, depended on the level of ‘ulamā’, the importance of the city, and the Shah’s opinion. Keywords: Safavid empire; Shīʿī ʿulamāʾ; ʿĀmilīs, Iran history

In 2005, Sayyid ‘Alī al-Husseinī al-Sīstānī urged Iraqi citizens to participate in the democratic elections and vote on the proposed referendum, which saw an additional 2,933,532 Iraqi voters register to participate compared to the previous vote of 2002. Al-Sīstānī’s actions as marja’ al-taqlīd or grand jurist - encouraging the Shiʿi majority to political action – a striking difference from his predecessors’ decision eight decades earlier under similar circumstances to discourage voting by their followers. If nothing else, the actions of al-Sīstānī indicate that the marjaʿīyya, or religious institution, is an important factor to consider in the socio-political life of Shiʿi Muslims in Iraq. While historically the political involvement of the marājiʿ was minimal, as most chose to practice quietism, some were political activists. The present research seeks to explore how, and under what circumstances, does the Iraqi Shiʿi marjaʿīyya leverage its religious authority to exert political influence. I conjecture that the marjaʿīyya of Al-Sīstānī influences the politics of Iraq in two ways: either through direct political action – that is through the issuing of public fatwās and working with political parties – or soft indirect suggestion by referencing politics in their khutbas (sermons) or answering political questions when asked. Moreover, I propose that there are four main inciting motivators that provoke the marājiʿ to act directly: oppression, foreign meddling, the centralizing/institutionalization of the marjaʿīyya and the Iraqi government, and the fiqh, or jurisprudence that Al-Sīstānī developed.

My paper will explore the transformation of the concept of velayat-e faqih from the early days of the revolution to the modern concept of valiye faqihe Mutlaq. This paper will compare the development of political Shi’ism to the transformation in the thought of Religious Zionist legal theology. It will compare the thought of Iranian revolutionaries with the philosophies of Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook (1865-1935) and his son Zvi Yehuda Kook (1891-1982). It will pay careful attention to the nexus between mysticism, law and state power. It will elaborate on how a charismatically constructed public sphere is either able or unable to embrace or sublimate, alternative epistemologies that displace the mysticism from the law.