This panel assembles political scientists interested in the impact of historical social conflicts on the development of contemporary institutions in the Arab world. The four papers examine authoritarian statebuilding in different states using a variety of primary and secondary sources in Arabic, English, and French.
"The Fiscal Politics of Egyptian Statebuilding, 1876-1879" looks at a moment of pact-making between Egypt's "maligned khedive" Ismail and the country's incipient parliament. As shown in the Arabic, English, and French historiography, between 1876 and June 1879 elected Egyptian delegates attempted to constrain Ismail by linking domestic revenue extraction to national authority. Delegates to the Assembly of Representatives, hailed from a narrow electorate comprising landowners and local headmen. Although their methods were quasi-constitutional their motives were material. Nonetheless, the clash between economic stakeholders and the Court constituted a milestone in the development of Egypt's modern political institutions.
"Democratic Citizens, Crown Subjects: Monarchy and State-Formation in the Middle East" turns to Morocco from the mid-20th century. In the post-colonial period, regimes in the region have experienced coups, civil war, and protests. This paper contrasts the behavior of pro-democracy citizens in monarchies with their counterparts in other authoritarian regimes, and considers how the possibility of achieving constitutional monarchy affects both the character and the likelihood of instability. The paper draws on three streams of evidence: cross-national analysis of authoritarian regimes, an examination of the collapse of monarchy in the Middle East in the early post-colonial period, and a subnational analysis of pro-democratic protest in contemporary Morocco.
With "Monarchical Authoritarianism: Wahhabism as National Identity in the Saudi Kingdom," the panel moves from the Maghreb to the Arabian Peninsula. This paper addresses the role of Wahhabism in forging a Saudi national identity, and consolidating the authoritarian state. During crisis periods, the Saudi regime has called upon Wahhabi religious interpretation and renewed the ties with the religious establishment. Thus the Saudi royal family was able to forge a 'Saudi' identity distinct from any other Arab or Islamic discourse. Evidence comes from a comparative analysis of Saudi domestic politics following the Iranian Revolution and the Arab Uprisings.
Finally, "Authoritarianism and Statebuilding in Iraq: Framing the role of Exclusionary Institutions" analyzes the effects of Iraq’s institutional configuration on communal politics. It utilizes data collected from the British National Archives, the Ba'th Party archives at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. and the Library of Congress. The author attributes failure in statebuilding to inappropriate institutional design and the imposition of a monolithic national identity. These traits prevented the state from fostering a national identity that would reconcile the institutional/structural governing apparatus with its diverse society.
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Dr. Shamiran Mako
This paper will analyze the effects of Iraq’s institutional configuration on communal politics (both ethnic and sectarian) using a historical-institutionalist approach. It utilizes data collected from the British National Archives, the Ba'th Party archives at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. and the Library of Congress. It explores the systemic forces that have defined the state’s identity through its institutional configuration, and analyze how and why critical transformations have reversed authoritarian and exclusionary governance. It attributes this failure in statebuilding to two interlinked processes. First, inappropriate institutional design at the time of state formation and subsequently under the monarchy institutionalized exclusionary and authoritarian politics in order to define and control the nascent state. Second, the imposition of a monolithic national identity under Ba’thist Iraq through the state’s governing institutions produced contention at the societal level amongst Iraq’s diverse ethnic and religious-sectarian groups. This resulted in the inability of the state to foster a national identity that would reconcile the institutional/structural governing apparatus with its diverse society through a binary social contract.
Consequently, and as a result of the above, state institutions, as instruments of the state’s governing capacity, have been entwined in Iraq’s communal politics. Thus, while 2003 marked a critical juncture that saw an alteration in the state’s institutional landscape, the reversal of exclusionary politics has meant that the primary drivers of resistance have been replaced by new communal power dynamics in response to preceding governing tactics. Consequently, although the state’s institutional landscape has been markedly altered since the Ba’thist era, the dynamics that fuel national dissonance remain unchanged, resulting in the reproduction of exclusionary and authoritarian politics since 2003.
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Adria Lawrence
When colonial rule in the Middle East ended in the mid 20th century, a variety of different kinds of regimes were charged with constructing the state in the post-colonial era: some were headed by monarchs, while others were run by nationalist parties and authoritarian strongmen. In the post-colonial period, these regimes have experienced different types of upheaval: coups, civil war, and protests. This paper argues that a state’s vulnerability to instability depended upon the authoritarian institutions in place. Specifically, monarchs were less likely to confront revolutionary protest than their counterparts in the authoritarian republics. This reduced threat from the street arises from a unique institutional feature: monarchies can democratize without destabilizing the leadership through transitioning to a constitutional monarchy. Constitutional monarchy is desirable because it offers both democracy and stability. Several observable implications follow from this argument. First, in comparison with other types of authoritarian regimes, we should observe lower levels of popular protest aimed at destabilizing the regime in monarchies; other types of opposition are not predicted to differ. Second, the constitutional monarchy option may complicate coordination among regime opponents. Third, it affects the kinds of reforms regime opponents seek. Fourth, it prompts citizens to engage in democratic practices and performances as part of an effort to transform the regime without overthrowing it.
This paper contrasts the behavior of pro-democracy citizens in monarchies with their counterparts in other authoritarian regimes, and considers how the possibility of achieving constitutional monarchy affects both the character and the likelihood of instability. The paper draws on three streams of evidence. It first conducts a cross-national analysis of authoritarian regimes by using two existing datasets, one on regime type and instability (Geddes, Wright and Franz 2013) and on one on popular protest (NAVCO 2.0, Chenoweth 2013). In addition, drawing on secondary sources, it engages in comparative historical analysis of the collapse of monarchy in the Middle East in the early post-colonial period. Finally, the author draws on field research, including participant observation, interviews, and a survey done via Facebook, to conduct a subnational study of pro-democratic protest in contemporary Morocco.
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May Darwich
In the wake of the Islamic revolution in 1979, and again during the 2011 Arab uprisings, the Saudi royal family seemed anxious and nervous about the prospects of instability in the Kingdom. Alongside generating unprecedented divisions within the ruling family, these uncertainties brought the most basic principle of the Saudi regime identity back to the fore and revealed a key mechanism in molding the national identity, namely Wahhabism. The Saudi elite in both historical instances have looked to reinforce their relationship with the most traditional power base, namely the religious establishment. The relationship between religion and the state in Saudi Arabia has been an intriguing subject for many scholars. Some studied religion as a source of legitimacy of the ruling family. Other considered traditional Islam an explanatory factor in the resilience of Al-Saud regime. This article addresses a similar issue: the role of Wahhabism in forging a Saudi national identity, and consolidating the authoritarian state. In times of crises, when the rule of Al-Saud was shaken, the Saudi regime called upon Wahhabi religious interpretation and renewed the ties with the religious establishment. Through this recurrent mechanism, the Saudi royal family was able to build a 'Saudi' identity distinct from any other Arab or Islamic discourse, and inextricably related to the political needs of Al-Saud. This Saudi national identity became a key mechanism in regime-led state consolidation and nation crafting. This paper examines this authoritarian mechanism through a comparative analysis of Saudi domestic politics following the Islamic revolution in 1979 and the Arab Uprisings of 2011. Relying on primary and secondary sources, the research is based an analysis of elite statements on the state identity and their conception of the 'other'. Based on such empirical analysis of Saudi politics, this article concludes that Wahhabism played a distinct role in consolidating the Saudi national identity around the rule of Al-Saud. Ultimately, this article contributes to the understanding of authoritarian survival strategies ‘beyond coercion’ and ‘beyond rentierism’.
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Between January 1876 and June 1879 elected Egyptian delegates attempted to constrain the country's ruler, Khedive Ismail, by linking domestic revenue extraction to national authority. Efforts to fuse representation with taxation were no more romantic or cynical than kindred experiments in Western Europe and the Americas. Delegates to Egypt's first representative parliament, the Assembly of Representatives, hailed from a narrow electorate comprising landowners and local headmen. Although their methods were quasi-constitutional their motives were material. Nonetheless, the clash between economic stakeholders and the Court constituted a milestone in the development of Egypt's modern political institutions.
Ismail had created the Assembly of Representatives in 1866 to impress foreign governments and garner larger loans. As he and the notables wrangled over taxes and the repayment of Egypt's mountainous foreign debts, however, they opened the prospect of anchoring the nascent Egyptian state to the country's landlords, merchants, and workers. The khedive eventually accepted a proposal from an expanded assembly (the National Assembly) for lowering domestic taxes, which were crushing the peasantry, and rescheduling—but not reneging on—payments to European creditors. This National Program (Al-Laiha al-Wataniyya), hailed an unprecedented exercise of power by a previously symbolic body.
What could have been a promising step toward constitutional monarchy ended abruptly in June 1879 when Germany, France, and England compelled the Ottoman Sultan to depose Ismail. They, like the Egyptian elites whose project they thwarted, were driven by fiscal considerations more than ideological ones. Simply put, the Assembly's plan for repaying Egyptian debt was less profitable for lenders than the alternative advocated by European appointed administrators. The pliant prince Tewfiq succeeded his father and opposition grew. When Egyptians rose up against the weak monarch and his foreign patrons in 1881-1882, British forces occupied the country, where they would remain for the next seven decades.
Using French, English, and Arabic primary materials, this paper asks: To what extent did the moment Egyptian notables turn the Assembly into a meaningful parliament that could resist foreign economic pressure and constrain the royal Court? The project informs debates in political science and sociology on statebuilding and revenue while also addressing the historiography of constitutionalism in Egypt.
