The Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1906-1911) was a complex sociopolitical movement that various ideologies supported. By 1906/7 Constitutionalists established a parliament and drafted a constitution that relied on the Shiite clerics’ participation. However, despite the clergy’s agreement on the Revolution’s initial plans that included modern ideas that Iranians had imported from Europe, the group soon fell into disagreement and a bitter fight ensued. The schism eventually turned violent that led to the killing of some notable clerics from both sides. Mullah Muhammad Kazim Khurasani (1839-1911) and Shaykh Fazlullah Nuri (1843-1909) were two of the famous clerics that at first supported Constitutionalism. Khurasani came from a humble upbringing and Nuri with his affluent background had close ties to the Iranian monarchy. Both had studied Shiite jurisprudence (fiqh) under one prestigious master (Mirza Hasan Shirazi) at Najaf. Khurasani became the rector of Najaf’s seminary and eventually the Shiite world’s highest-ranking Source of Imitation (marja’), while Nuri chose to return to Tehran and became a leading religious figure in the Iranian capital. Nuri first sided with Constitutionalists but suddenly changed his mind and openly opposed Khurasani. Nuri viewed secular civil codes, which the Constitution guaranteed, as un-Islamic. He objected to a long list of goals of the Constitutionalists, which included establishment of schools for women and equal rights for all Iranians. But Khurasani not only did not object to any of that, he used a rational approach to support what he thought Iran desperately needed which was a representative legislative body and laws that protected everyone. Consequent to that belief Khurasani issued several statements claiming anyone who objected to Constitutionalism was an infidel (kafir) and thus should be dealt with accordingly. Khurasani sources used for this study include his religious decrees, statements, and letters to different entities including the parliament expressing his support of that institution in addition to contemporary accounts and newspapers of the early 1900s. Nuri’s sources include his nightly bulletin that he published and paid for personally while protesting the establishment of the parliament in his sermons and contemporary accounts that were published in newspapers at the time. Through careful examination, comparison, and juxtaposition of these sources, this study suggests that Nuri became an anti-Constitutionalist since he thought the constitution would undermine clerical power in Iran and also negatively affect his wealth that he now had to pay taxes for.

For decades, historians explained the Western intervention in Iran of 1953 as in terms of anticipating an impending communist takeover, a claim often asserted at the time by the politicians in Great Britain and the United States. In 2001, Ervand Abrahamian put the accuracy of this explanation in the unfolding events in Iran between 1951 and 1953 into question. His questioning resulted in a reorientation of the discussion of the 1950s in Iran. In my presentation I would like to place the events of 1951-53 in Iran into the wider context of Western policies toward oil producing countries since the mid-interwar years. For instance, is there a relationship between the Mexican nationalization of oil in 1938 and the Iranian one in 1951? What are the important discursive elements on ‘oil nationalization’ and the ‘Mexican example’ in the early 1950s? Could Iran have succeeded in extracting, producing, and selling its oil? In this regard, was Mexico successful? How should one interpret the anti-nationalization discourse rampant in the oil industry in the post-war era? Moreover, were the American and British positions on the Iranian crisis monolithic? How relevant is the European post-WWII recovery to the oil crisis in Iran? Did the ‘communist danger’ seem more of a reality in Europe than in Iran? What did ‘partial nationalization’ mean? In seeking answers to such questions, this analysis will make use of an archival collection, available at the University of Wyoming, of an oil expert, Walter J. Levy, who served in a number of government positions as an oil advisor. This collection, so far untapped by historians, is relevant not only because of its richness in providing a regional and global perspective on the dynamics of the oil industry but also important since it gives voice to the Iranians, the representatives of the oil industry, and the policy-makers in DC. While the existing secondary literature, memoirs, and other unclassified sources will serve to complement what might be ‘edited off’ in the Levy collection, the shifting dynamics of the Western political economy of oil will enhance our understanding of the 1950s in Iran, Europe, and the US alike.

This paper analyzes the relationship between the Qajar and Ottoman empires and contextualizes it in the emerging sectarian power struggle during the late nineteenth century. The unprecedented growth of Shi’ism in Iraq during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries alarmed the Ottoman state, which justified and derived its power from the Sunni caliphate. To mediate this, the Ottomans implemented various laws and policies to decrease the Shi’i presence in Iraq, including the promoting “Sunni” education, sending Sunni ulama to live amongst the Iraqis, and even offering funding to the Shi’i communities to establish rapport. These policies were also intended to diminish Qajar influence in the region, the primary force supporting the religious minority’s growth. The examination of Qajar primary documents during Mozafareddin Shah’s reign from 1896-1906, however, reveals that the implementation of Ottoman policies had little effect on Qajar officials and the Shi’i populace. Qajar officials continued to support Shi’i ulama, the upkeep of Shi’i mosques, and the hosting of Shi’i commemorations in Iraqi cities. Despite Ottoman intentions, the Treaty of Erzurum in 1828 prevented Ottomans from enacting more effective reforms in addressing Qajar involvement, ultimately allowing the Persians to continue their ties with the local Shi’is of Iraq. This treaty gave Persian officials foreign status in the Empire, thus guaranteeing state protection. This special legal status gave Persian officials more room to maneuver than the Ottomans had intended. By the late nineteenth century, Shi’ism was so strongly entrenched amongst the Iraqis that the Ottoman efforts failed to have much impact. Regardless of the actions taken by the Ottoman government, Persian influence in Iraq remained pervasive, an ongoing trend that still thrives on international and regional politics.