Authorship in Performance in the Post-revolutionary Iranian Cinema This presentation explores the reappearance of stars in the post-revolutionary Iranian cinema. It argues that the star image in art-house movies is a new phenomenon, not comparable to the star image of the pre-revolutionary films as the rise of these stars is linked with a sense of style and artistic authority in performance. This is a novel phenomenon since art movies before the revolution were more or less associated with directorial authorship and never developed a well-established star system. I will study authorship in performance as represented by Ezatollah Entezami and Nikki Karimi to depict that the star image in post-revolutionary art cinema transcends the scopophilic and fetishistic approaches. I will show how the fruitful collaboration of a number directors and actors resulted in memorable productions like Banoo (1999), The Fifth Reaction (2005), and Sara (1990). The discussion will briefly explore the role of stars associated with the filmfarsi cinema before the revolution. In this period, Iranian celebrities were considered as visual commodities, commercialized through marketing channels and “consumed” by spectators. The Islamic government, however, resented the star-based cinema and the Ministry of Islamic Guidance (Irshad) advocated an anti-cultist film industry. In the new circumstances, the directors were not able to glamorize stars as such. Instead, the formal cinema further relied on performers whose acting technique could compensate for the sexual and violent scenes that proved lucrative in the box-office. Nevertheless, the stars in commercial cinema are still “viewed” as the subject of spectators’ visual pleasure in a more modest manner. The authorship of performance in the case of actors such as Entezami and Karimi resides in their mass popularity without the help of subsidiary circulation in tabloids or fanazines. They are not typecast but have played a wide array of roles. Both of them successfully evaded to be used as raw materials of mise-en-scene and editing. I conclude that the star image of actors like Entezami and Karimi relies on a more abstract and spiritual level similar to that of the pahlavans (in the wrestling and martial arts) and Persian poets. Although both Entezami and Karimi became initially popular for their good looks, their artistic persona has little to do with the fetishistic photo-effect. I believe that the emergence of strong male and female actors with style deconstructed the conventional gendered roles and furthered the flourishing of Iranian post-revolutionary art films.

Scholars of Iran generally divide the post-Revolutionary period into two parts, focusing much of their work on either the Islamic Republic under Khomeini (1979-1989) or the Reformist movement and Khatami’s presidency (1997-2005). However, scholarship has thus far neglected to consider the reconfiguration of commitment to the Revolution during the first period into a set of Reformist policies that diverge considerably from the original ideals of the Republic. At what point, then, did the Revolutionary fervor begin to subside and disillusionment set in? This paper seeks to address this question by examining two individuals, Mohsen Makhmalbaf and Mohammad Khatami, who played important roles in both periods. More specifically, it attempts to probe their positions in a series of debates that emerged in Iranian newspapers following the release of Nawbat-e ‘asheqi [Time for Love], a controversial film written and directed by Makhmalbaf in 1991. This approach will ultimately allow me to position the Nawbat-e ‘asheqi episode as an early sign of the Revolutionary discontent that emerges more fully several years later and in turn suggest that it represents a pivotal moment in the transition from Revolutionary to Reformist policy. At the core of this project—and at the core of the debates it studies—is the question of who controls art in Iran. The film industry proves fruitful to this discussion because the Islamic Republic, through censorship and subsidies, plays a significant role in the production movies. However, this system gives rise to questions about categorization—should a film be considered the director’s work or does it, in part, belong to the government? Who, then, is accountable for its controversial release? This paper is concerned with public perceptions and takes as a case study the Iranian responses to these kinds of concerns in their reactions to the movie Nawbat-e ‘asheqi. It examines a wide-range of articles that were published about the film in Iranian newspapers during the spring of 1991 to chart the debate as it evolved from a reaction to a particular movie into a full-force critique of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. This debate and the popular opinions it conveys serve as points of resistance, against which we might situate Makhmalbaf and Khatami. A detailed analysis of this debate and the shifts in its trajectory will, therefore, illuminate emerging fissures and rising discontent among those individuals charged with the creation and regulation of art in the early 1990s.

My paper examines the agents, structures and factors that were decisive in processes that led to the production of government-sanctioned pop music, and its broadcast on Iran’s state television and radio, starting in the mid-1990s. Following Iran’s revolution of 1979 and the formation of the Islamic Republic, revolutionary cultural committees were erected to direct and control the shape, content and distribution of all forms of cultural production, chief among them music, as music’s legitimacy has long been contested within Islam. In this paper, I look in particular at a pivotal turnaround decision by the Iranian government to engage in the production of fast-paced pop music, after more than a decade of stringent regulatory measures that only allowed for traditional Iranian music as well as somber religious and war music. This decision led to the creation of an entire industry of pop music producers, performers and distributors who to this day contribute to a strictly regulated but nevertheless burgeoning musical field. While “depraved” pre-revolutionary pop music was banned soon after 1979, the state, conscious not only of a young population’s desire for a more uplifting music, but also of an increasingly integrated world where access to foreign creations through satellite television and the Internet was becoming ever more possible, devised its own strategy for producing pop music that was acceptable within the parameters of the Islamic Republic, as determined by various persons and institutions, such as certain ulama, the culture ministry’s Music Council, the Supreme Council for Cultural Revolution, and the Organization for Islamic Promotion. Based broadly on Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of the field and habitus, my research moves between two integrated levels of analysis, whereby a picture is drawn of the mutually conditioning structures and agents within this field, as well as the form and content of the ensuing product. Drawing on my fieldwork in Iran, which includes in-depth interviews with officials, artists and producers who were instrumental to this process, I study the policies that were implemented (structures), highlight the most influential decision makers (agents), and examine how their views were informed. Here I also study the role of religious versus cultural considerations, and the justifications utilized for these decisions. Finally, my paper discusses the broad social and cultural impact of the outcome of this policy, and briefly examines a few cases where government positions have been negotiated and contested by musicians and consumers alike.

This paper analyzes contemporary Iranian video games and explores the ways in which they communicate different concepts of identity. It is based on a content analysis of more than 20 video games developed in Iran between the years 2005-2009, alongside interviews with 7 different Iranian game producers. It will analyze various audiovisual signifiers in Iranian video games, including their narrative and game play structures. The research methodology encompasses recent trends in cultural studies, computer science, and game studies. Substantive portions of the materials considered in this paper were gathered during a fieldwork trip to Tehran in 2008. Video games are a form of mainstream media for Iranian youth, and have become a popular leisure time activity. These games provide them with various cultural symbols, myths, and rituals, which then become a constituent part of their identities. At the same time, most games on the Iranian market are developed and produced in the United States and Europe. Unsurprisingly, the Iranian authorities are particularly concerned about the negative influence of such games on Iranian youth. Therefore, they established the National Institute of Computer Games in Tehran in 2006 in order to subsidize development of games in Iran, conceived in accordance with Iranian and Islamic values. Consequently, a variety of independent producers have become involved in this emerging industry. Capitalizing on the Bogost’s notion of ‘procedural rhetoric,’ this paper will analyze contemporary Iranian video games and explores the ways in which the identity of the hero, i.e. the virtual representation of the player’s self, is constructed. Essentially, it argues that whereas the Iranian government perceives games as a new semiotic language of the youth and therefore utilizes them to promote Islamic values and foster national pride, many independent producers maneuver within the and around state’s interests, presenting instead their own, oftentimes quite different concepts of identity. Therefore contemporary Iranian games encompass a broad variety of topics, ranging from the Islamic revolution through popular soap operas to ancient Persian mythology. The resulting concepts of identity are achieved through sensitive negotiations between the demands, funding and restrictions of the Islamic state and the visions and engagement of private entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, this paper demonstrates that despite varying ideological background, independent and state-funded producers both share a common belief: that they are misrepresented by global video game production and strive to present unique Iranian heroes to their audiences.