In Relocating Middle Powers, A. Cooper, et al., proposed that “pursuing multilateral solutions to international problems, preferring compromise positions in international disputes and embracing notions of good international citizenship constitute the typical behavior of a middle power.” In 1996, P. Kennedy, et al., developed the concept of “pivotal states,” i.e., states, including Algeria, which have the aptitude to influence regional and international stability and which are so important regionally that their collapse would result in largescale chaos. Since the end of the black decade in the 1990s and its resurgence as a key regional and international actor, Algeria has been defined as a “middle power,” a “regional power,” or as a “pivotal state.” These categorizations derive in part from the fact that Algeria is the largest country in Africa and boasts important primary and military resources. In spite of this tremendous capacity, Algerian policymakers refrain from articulating a military doctrine that would reexamine the long-held principles of noninterference that have prevented them from defending more effectively the country’s interests in both the Maghrebi and Sahelian neighborhoods. While the security forces have been quite effective in neutralizing Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and the Islamic State domestically, decision-makers have been obstinately unwilling to intervene militarily outside the country’s borders or even to launch hot-pursuits against terrorist groups, actions which could strengthen the country’s security. While the authorities have offered their mediation in several conflicts (Libya, Tunisia, Mali…), they have rejected counsel from great powers to play a mightier regional role as a military power. The proposed paper seeks to elucidate the main elements and reasons for Algeria’s reluctance to become a genuine regional power through a thorough analysis of its security policy in the Maghreb-Sahel. The contention to be tested is that while Algeria is unquestionably a middle power, it has nonetheless refrained from acting as a pivotal state. The paper will look at competing security strategies within Algeria’s establishment. Elucidating the reasons for such reluctance will make a contribution to the study of Algeria’s foreign and security policy and unveil some of its determinants. It will rely on extensive multi-year fieldwork in Algeria, including interviews with several dozen of high officials in the Algerian national security and foreign policy establishment, writings of Algerian and foreign analysts and academics, as well as the literature on middle powers and on rivalries.

Tunisia’s political transition has been hailed as a success story in comparison to all other Arab Spring experiences. However, the economic transition has not kept pace with the political transition and has been difficult, hesitant and, at times, hopeless. The difficulties stem from 1) structures, legal framework, and entrenched “ways of doing thing” inherited from the Ben Ali regime; 2) a restrictive international economic context, and 3) compromise policies (or lack thereof) enacted by transition governments in 2011- 2014. In spite of funding from international financial institutions, the E.U., the United States and Arab Gulf states, Tunisia has failed to recover since the 2010-11 uprising. The economy suffers from slow growth, fewer foreign investments, crippled tourism, serious regional economic imbalances, high unemployment—especially among the youth—persistently high government expenditures, and budget and current account deficits. These serious economic difficulties threaten political change and stability. This paper focuses on obstacles to economic takeoff in the structural (players and their power) and institutional settings (formal and informal rules and mechanisms). Particular attention will be paid to the role and power of formal and informal socioeconomic groups, such as the UGTT, the largest labor Union, the employers' organization UTICA, public company managers, big private businesses with political clout, youth movements seeking jobs and opportunity, and the organized unemployed. It will examine the institutional setting, especially the formal and informal norms inherited from the past which might be stifling good governance, maintaining bureaucratic inefficiency, inhibiting investment and privileging some economic sectors and agents over others. Several fieldwork trips to Tunisia and new field research in 2017 will include gathering data and information and interviews with a variety of economic actors. Two empirical questions and a theoretical one will be tackled, respectively, in this paper. First, to what extent does the current configuration of internal and external political and economic forces (structure) inhibit Tunisia’s economic revival? Second, to what extent have Tunisia’s institutional reforms since 2011 leveled the playing field for all economic agents or merely replicated what the Jasmine Revolution tried to undo? Third, does democratic governance in transitional societies hinder or facilitate difficult but necessary economic policies? The paper will address the first two questions using structural and institutional approaches and will seek empirical evidence on the nature and impact of the relationship between democratic governance and economic austerity policies.

The history of Tunisian women’s activism is well known among Tunisian scholars (Charrad 2007, 2011; Charrad and Zarrugh 2014; Khalil 2014). However, we know very little about the status of women’s rights and associations today (Gilman 2007). Prior to the 2011 revolution, the number of women’s rights associations had fluctuated was fewer than five since the 1980s. As of 2012, the government counted 35 registered women’s rights associations (Ben Amara & Ibtissem Mathlouthi 2012). Tunisian women’s rights had been the most progressive in the MENA region thanks to state feminism and the work of elite feminists who formed l’association des Femmes Tunisiennes pour la Recherche sur le Développement (AFTURD) and l'association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates (ATFD) (Labidi 2007; Arfaoui 2007). Given Tunisia’s exceptional progress in this area, why did we witness a sevenfold increase in the number of women’s associations starting in 2011? What were their new grievances? Why did newly active women not join existing women’s associations? In this paper, I identify and shed light on key women’s associations that emerged during the political transition and continue to exist. There is a gap in the literature across sociology and Middle East Studies about these new groups and others like them in different political contexts. Their aims, actions, and funding remain unknown or undocumented. This case study sheds light on the attitudes of leaders of women’s associations in Tunisia. It contributes to the literature on how interest groups capitalize on the insecurity and hesitancy of new governments especially during democratic transitions from authoritarianism. I draw on Alexis de Tocqueville’s and Robert Putnam’s theories of civil society and Max Weber’s work on the state. Most Tunisian women involved in these new associations reject state feminism and elite secular feminist principles. They operate in a more open political climate where they can establish headquarters, meet publicly, receive foreign funding, and criticize state policies regarding women’s rights. Two organizations--Aswat Nisaa and Ligue des Electrices Tunisiennes—emerged during the Arab Spring and exemplify the new wave of revolutionary women’s organizations. Their primary political objective is to increase women's political representation, including voting and running for local as well as national office. They are actively engaged in creating a democratic civil society. I conducted this fieldwork in Tunisia through participant observation and dozens of indepth interviews at the headquarters of the two key associations mentioned above. The secondary literature on these associations is very limited.

The bewildering array of collaborations, clashes, and competitions between the Islamic State in North Africa and Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) continues to confuse analysts, policymakers and academics. While accounts of ramped up rivalry and staunch ideological disagreements have dominated analysis since the creation of the Islamic State in 2014, the steady migration of fighters and numerous cells between the two groups and other kinds of confusing cross-pollination feed into the narrative that the two organizations not only collaborate more than they compete, but that this collaboration is likely to grow in coming months and years. Analytical approaches to the phenomena vary according to frameworks of observation as much evolutions in the organizations and phenomena observed. For example, what might be characterized as “Islamism-confrontational” analysis tends lump the groups together as birds of a feather--brothers and sisters in arms--whereas “Islamism-accommodationist” approaches tend towards splitting and taxonomizing them as separate, even irreconcilable, groups. Based on years of intensive periodic fieldwork and analysis in Algeria, Tunisia, and five other countries--including interviews with dozens of governmental, corporate, and academic counter-terrorism experts in 2016 and 2017, in addition to analysis of a variety of militant interviews, accounts, and social media posts--this paper will argue that the Islamic State – AQIM nexus is a complex, overlapping network that features situational and opportunistic actors who are nonetheless grounded in institutional, ideological, historical, and other structural frameworks. In addition, at the discursive level, the two organizations and their rank and file membership are characterized by hybridic language and philosophies that not only borrow readily from each other, but borrow from an array of other local contestatory movements, capitalizing on local grievances. For example, AQIM recruitment preceding, during and following the 2016 Krechba, Algeria, gas facility rocket attacks featured green, pro-environmental, anti-fracking messaging not only for recruitment purposes but also to attempt to increase local legitimacy and media relevancy. Analysis of discursive hybridity will be central to the analysis and refutes both the strict taxonomy approach and essentializing analysis focused on Islamism. Primary sources in Arabic and French will be privileged. The paper will map the IS-AQIM nexus, creating a framework for grassroots level analysis of ever-changing hybridic tactics and modalities of radical Islamist groups operating adjacently, and will offer policy recommendations regarding more thoughtful and holistic approaches to understanding and addressing the challenges posed by these violent contestations.

More than two decades before the MENA region was shaken by protest and regime change, Algeria had its own experience with a major political transformation and contestation. After a failed democratization attempt, a coup and an almost decade-long civil war, the Algerian regime once again consolidated itself and has emerged today as one of the most robust authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa. This paper seeks to answer the question, “What makes the Algerian authoritarian regime robust?” How did the regime consolidate itself in a successful manner after a near regime collapse? What was the core of the revival of authoritarian regime in Algeria? What made the post-crisis regime different from the pre-crisis regime? Building upon the literature on comparative authoritarianism, this paper answers these questions through a within-case comparison between pre-1989 and current Algerian regimes. It argues that the Algerian regime reconfigured itself during the crises of the 1990s and diversified its survival toolkit. Today, there are three categories of tools that the regime uses for its survival and persistence. First, the regime still relies on a set of pre-1989 tools, such as oil rents. Second, the regime reconfigured some of the old tools such as the coercive apparatus and regime legitimacy during the 1990s. Third, it introduced new tools such as a refashioned multiparty system and political reforms that give further flexibility and resilience against challenges. By this adaptation and diversification of tools, the Algerian experience represents a successful transition from a single-party authoritarianism to a modern electoral authoritarianism. Unlike the pre-1989 regime, the current Algerian regime can benefit from a variety of tools when faced with challenges which render it more robust and resilient. In this regard, Algerian experience combines several arguments in the literature for authoritarian survival that are drawn from the experiences of authoritarianism in post-communist sphere, Africa, Southeast Asia and the Middle East (Ghandi and Przeworski 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2010; Smith 2005; Heydemann 2007). The paper relies on an extensive fieldwork in Algeria, including an archival research on the old regime and interviews with officials, politicians, journalists and experts most of whom experienced the regime in both periods and witnessed the revival of authoritarianism during the 1990s.