This paper focuses principally on Iran’s regional security objectives in the Persian Gulf through the lens of its Hormuz Peace Endeavor (HOPE), a proposal outlined by former President Rouhani in September 2019 at the United Nations General Assembly. Calling for the inclusion of all Persian Gulf littoral states in a single collective security system, and advocating for the exclusion of non-regional powers, a close examination of this plan aids our understanding of how Iran’s vision for Persian Gulf security cooperation departs from the existing framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states backed by U.S. military forces in the region. After describing the core tenets of HOPE and explaining how this plan would revise the collective security status quo in the region, the paper then seeks to answer how, after coming to office in 2021, President Raisi and his administration have referred to the HOPE framework, particularly given that this initiative was proposed by a political adversary and ideological opponent. Furthermore, the paper describes the lukewarm response toward HOPE from the Arab Gulf states, as well as the intransigence of the United States regarding the prospect of its withdrawal from the region. Lastly, the paper examines the ‘Axis of Resistance’ foreign policy concept advanced by the Raisi administration, with particular attention to statements by government officials, including Foreign Minister Amir-Abdollahian, calling for the institutionalization of this principle in practice. Through this comparative analysis, a clear picture of how the tension in Iran’s post-revolutionary domestic politics, between conservative and hardline factions on one hand, and reformists and moderates on the other, is made manifest in two competing visions for regional security.

This paper is part of a wider project that explores how the Islamic Republic of Iran legitimises itself as a post-revolutionary government to both internal and external audiences. However, the Islamic Republic’s legitimacy is not only challenged by external actors and dynamics, but also internal revolutionary processes such as the Green Movement and the Woman, Life, Freedom Movement. The research question that the paper seeks to answer is how the Islamic Republic’s relationships with Russia and China relate to the way the Islamic Republic legitimises itself as a post-revolutionary state. In terms of methodology and theoretical framework, the paper builds on debates in neo-Gramscian IR and International Historical Sociology regarding revolution and the international, which highlight the importance of historical context and the interconnected nature of domestic/internal and international/external politics. The paper particularly draws on Fred Halliday’s work on the importance of the role that ideas of revolutionaries play in highlighting not only aspiration for domestic order, but also world order. The approach borrows from Antonio Gramsci’s notions of subalternity, hegemony, and domination and the Discourse Theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. The paper is primarily based on a discourse analysis of President Ebrahim Raisi’s speeches and texts. Raisi’s presidency is significant because it explicitly demonstrates a turn to ‘the East’ represented by Russia and China. This is not only for economic reasons in the contexts of sanctions, but also for political reasons because of Russia’s and China’s political standing in the international system. The paper’s contention is two-fold. First, it argues that an appreciation of both the external and internal contexts contribute to a better understanding of the power dynamics embedded in Islamic Republic’s relationship with Russia and China. The external context includes Donald Trump’s rescinding of the Iran nuclear deal and his close relationship with Benyamin Netanyahu on the one hand, and regional dynamics on the other hand. This involves the Islamic Republic’s policy of ‘Axis of Resistance’; an intensification of Saudi Arabia-Iran relations; and the deterioration of Israel-Iran relations. The internal context includes protests between 2017 and 2020 and the Woman, Life, Freedom protests. Second, it argues that the Islamic Republic’s eastern gaze is significant because it contributes to legitimising to the Islamic Republic in the international system. This is done by demonstrating a collective challenge to a liberal world order. This in turn legitimises the Islamic Republic’s ‘anti-imperialist’ narrative.

Three events of the past 18th months, namely, The Woman, Life, Freedom Movement of September 2022, the China-brokered Suadi-Iran deal of March 2023, and the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel loom large in Iran’s recent history. These events presented challenges and opportunities for the Islamic Republic of Iran. This paper explores how these three events have affected Iran’s domestic and foreign policy objectives during the past 18 months. Specifically, I will argue that “purification” has become the centerpiece of Iran’s domestic policy. The purification project that had started even before the Presidential Election of 2021 is being pursued with more rigor and purpose after the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising. To address the gap between the new generation of Iranians and the old revolutionaries, the Nezam, I will argue, had two fundamental choices to make: to liberalize or to tighten the grip. The Nezam chose the latter and is willing to pay the sociopolitical costs associated with this policy. The ascendancy of the narrative of the super-revolutionaries was followed by electoral policies and procedures of the Guardian Council to ensure a more homogenized and purified Nezam(regime) especially when the election of the Assembly of Experts and that of the successor were on the horizon. Regionally, contrary to what one may expect after the super-headliners' ascendancy, I will argue that the Islamic Republic’s eastward-looking and the use of proxies approach to global and regional politics are being recalibrated after what has unfolded since October 7. The Islamic Republic’s call for the destruction of the Zionist state as well as its longstanding opposition to the two-state solution seems to have been merely rhetorical. However, the crux of my presentation will be about the inconsistency that exists between Iran’s domestic purification agenda after Woman, Life, Freedom, and its softer, gentler, and even more pragmatic approach to its regional politics. I will argue that the domestic purification project has not led to a more aggressive or belligerent approach in the region after October 7. Iran’s military responses, I will argue, have been measured and quite contained. This may indicate that Iran’s foreign policy is less ideological and more pragmatic than is generally believed.