In this paper I will try to explain the Israeli reaction to the events known generally as the Arab Spring. I will cover public opinion polls, editorial, the writings of scholars, and the pronouncements of leaders and organizations. The explanation given will dwell on both domestic factors & international ones.

The "Arab Spring" that erupted so suddenly at the height of last winter (January 2011) has long since metamorphosed into a hot and steamy Middle Eastern "summer." While in Tunis, Egypt and Libya, and maybe also in Yemen, one can speak about the "end of the beginning" of these revolutions, so it seems, in Syria the uprising has turned into bloody struggles, not to say a civil war, between segments and factions divided for the most part along social or communal lines. For Israel all this represented a dramatic change that called into question many of the basic assumptions upon which Jerusalem based its policies in the region during recent decades. So it is no wonder that Israel is following the regional developments closely, with both great interest and unconcealed concern. It is also no wonder that a debate had broken out in the Israeli public over whether the regional developments should be viewed as a source of renewed threats to the country or, rather, perhaps a hopeful opening or window of opportunity for improving Israel's status in the region, if it knows how to take advantage of the situation. Moreover, as in previous years, 2012 is expected to be the Year of Iran. It is clear, however, that in the shadow of Iranian-American-Israeli tension it is unlikely that any progress will be achieved in the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. Thus, much is dependent on the American policy and on American moves of the coming American administration after the 2012 elections. At the same time, Hizballah, deepened its cooperation with Iran, preparing itself for a possible confrontation which might start in the Persian Gulf and from there might spread to the shores of the Levant. Syria, however, found itself focusing more then ever in its recent history in the domestic crisis which might lead to the fall of the Asad dynasty. On the other side, Hamas, Syria's former ally, found itself caught in between its former allies and the Sunni muslim movements in the Arab world, struggling to maintain its control over the Gaza strip. Thus, in this front too, Israel and the Arabs find themselves in the face of the same dilemma – looking for peace or maintaining the status qua.

Israel and Saudi Arabia have both experienced changes in their strategic environments as a result of the Arab uprisings. For both Riyadh and Jerusalem, the uprisings bring much political uncertainty. Of particular mutual concern is the threatened failure of several Arab states: Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq, and the unknown direction of Egyptian regional policy. Much of this is related to the confrontation with Iran. Saudi Arabia acts as the leader of the Sunni world, poised to defend it against the Shiite heresy, while Israel is the Jewish state, home to about 45 percent of the world’s Jews. The Iranian leadership has called often for Israel’s destruction, and has been at loggerheads with the anti-Shiite Wahhabi leaders of Saudi Arabia since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Both Israel and Saudi Arabia had relied on Mubarak’s Egypt as a linchpin in the regional effort to prevent the expansion of Iran’s sphere of influence – the “Shiite crescent” feared equally by Israel and the Sunni regimes of the Middle East. But the fall of the Mubarak regime represents a serious setback for both countries as they try to contain Iran. The failure of states invites foreign intervention. Iran is already expanding its influence in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Should these states fail entirely, it would be a boost to Tehran. Saudi Arabia has acted to shore up its position in the wake of these developments. It has seized on the unrest in Syria to deal a double blow to Iran: it seeks to remove the pro-Iranian regime of Bashar al-Asad, thereby also undermining Syria’ support for the Iranian supported Hizballah. Closer to home, it has sent troops into Bahrain to quell the Shiite uprising there. The Arab unrest only heightens the severity of the desperation felt in Jerusalem and Riyadh about a nuclear-armed Iran. If Tehran succeeds in getting the bomb its regional influence will increase many fold. It will be able to call the shots in Lebanon, Syria, and Bahrain, and become a serious threat to the Saudi-dominated Persian Gulf energy sector. Such a development would also lead to nuclear proliferation: Saudi Arabia has already hinted that it would attempt to get the bomb should Iran do so. Should Israel decide to attack Iranian nuclear sites via Saudi airspace, it is likely that common interest will prevail, leading to a “malfunction” in Saudi air defenses.