On 26 March Egypt and Israel signed a peace treaty after years of bloody conflict – a major milestone in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The countries agreed to Normalize relations yet each interpreted and perceived normalization differently. The transition from conflict to peace poses a great challenge to scholars of conflict resolution, and yet the subject of normalization has received little attention in existing IR literature. Based on a broader research project dealing with Egypt-Israel relations, this paper examines the different meanings of normalization, their implementation in Egypt–Israel bilateral relations and their implications for the wider regional relations. To begin with, it will distinguish between three main settings of normalization, which indicate the status of pre-normalization relations: recognition and establishment of bilateral ties for the first time; restoration of previously severed bilateral ties; and formalization and expansion of pre-existing bilateral ties. Then it examines the historical context of the pre-normalization dispute and distinguishes between two types of contexts: with and without a history of direct violent / protracted militarized conflict. Applying these forms of normalization to Egyptian–Israeli relations, the paper seeks to enhance our understanding of issues and challenges in establishing full normalization after protracted conflict and war. Drawing on primary source material from archives, official publications, the Egyptian press, Arabic books and articles, interviews, and secondary sources in various languages, the paper proffers two new forms of normalization of relations: One is material/strategic normalization which may be defined as partial normalization; The other is people-to-people / cultural normalization which demonstrates complete reconciliation expressed in full normalization. The empirical discussion focuses on the Egyptian perspective on normalization with Israel and presents the considerations of the Egyptian leaders, from Sadat to ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, which led Egypt to limit normalization to the governmental level mostly. It also presents the ongoing debate among the Egyptian cultural elite and actors from within Egypt’s civil society regarding full normalization between the two peoples.

In my paper I intend to reconstruct the history of the border between Gaza and Israel and, in particular, the policies implemented by the various Israeli governments in regulating access/exit to/from the Strip between 1967, when there was a total opening, to 2007, when a complete shutdown began. More specifically, I want to highlight some turning points of this policy: 1971, when a security fence was erected around the Strip; 1991, when Israel introduced for the first time the system of exit permits for the population of the Strip; 1994, when the partial withdrawal of the army from Gaza was accompanied by the birth of the Palestinian Authority but also by the system of checkpoints within the Strip; 2000, when the outbreak of the Second Intifada saw the beginning of a policy of progressive closure; 2005, when the Israeli disengagement, instead of improving the situation, further diminished the possibility of the Palestinian population leaving Gaza; 2007, with the total closure of the Strip after the Hamas "coup d`état". In terms of questions, I aim at addressing the following ones: What were the reasons that led the Israeli government to act in this way? What objectives did this aim to achieve? What consequences did these choices have on the relations between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority? What impact did this politics have on the living condition of the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip as well as the Israeli population living in the surrounding areas? In addition to the existing bibliography, I will mainly use two types of primary sources: reports by UN agencies, and international and local NGOs, as well as press (Israeli, Palestinian and international).

The frequently repeated narrative of the experiences of the Federal Republic of Germany in the post-WWII Middle East sees West Germany sitting between two chairs: its lucrative economic contacts with Arab countries pushed it into a pro-Arab direction; on the other hand, historical and moral factors militated in favour of a pro-Israeli orientation. It is generally assumed that West Germany, having balanced precariously for the better part of two decades, fell over its recognition of Israel in 1965. Based on hitherto unpublished documents found in the archives of the West German Foreign Intelligence Service (Org. Gehlen/ Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND)), which the applicant was able to access during his work as member of the Independent Commission of Historians for the History of the BND (UHK), the presentation proposes to take issue with the above mentioned scenario. It argues that West Germany’s activities in the Arab countries also intended to obtain information about Egyptian policy and military strategy by involving Germans centrally in the field of the procurement and manufacture of arms. These informations allowed Israel to formulate sound and ultimately victorious policies and strategies: the Israelis thus were served well by their West German allies. In order to draw a veil over this collaboration the Federal Republic and Israel staged an elaborate theatre performance, which did not refrain from a somewhat cynical use of the Nazi past. While this led to fierce political debates among the uninitiated and even more so in the media, the factual fallout of Israeli retaliatory actions to sabotage the work of the missile experts was rather low. If one looks behind the theatre curtains, a remarkably efficient ploy to support Israel and to foster western interests becomes visible. In conclusion: the plan of the USA (who directed the “West German” foreign intelligence community until 1955 and exerted a strong influence over it thereafter) to use the good prestige of the Germans as an economically strong, but politically and militarily weak power without colonial history and ambitions in the Middle East succeeded brilliantly. Instead of playing the role of quasi-neutral, West Germany – driven by its ambition to establish its kudos and value within the Western camp of the Cold War – played an important role in the emergence of Israel as the dominant military power in the region.

Since it rose to power in 1979, the Islamic Republic has constituted one of the foremost security challenges for both the United States and Israel. In addition to Iran’s nuclear program, one of the top areas of concern has been Iran’s support for non-state actors across the Middle East, and especially those stationed along Israel’s borders, namely, Hezbollah and Hamas. While much has been made of Iran’s opposition to Israel and the roles of its support for such groups in manifesting that opposition, much less attention has been given to how Iranian leaders actually understand their strategic interests vis-à-vis Israel-Palestine and how they conceptualize the reasons behind their antagonistic stance. This paper, which is based on an in-progress book project, adds that missing piece by analyzing how Iranian leaders view the bases of their positions on Israel-Palestine. It focuses particularly on the assessments of Israeli policies produced by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the numerous publications and statements it has released on those subjects. Paying close attention to the first decade following the 1979 revolution, the paper uncovers the considerations that gave rise to the shift in Iran’s position on Israel-Palestine that accompanied the establishment of the new regime. It shows that even in this early period IRGC and other Iranian leaders based their opposition to Israel not on Islamic-revolutionary ideology but on their rejection of colonialism and Western intervention in the Middle East, which formed an important part of Iran’s efforts to define its own place in the world. Particularly important is the view that the Israeli occupation of Palestine represents and should be recognized as a lasting and negative vestige of Euro-American domination of the region. Accordingly, the paper demonstrates that Iran’s opposition to Israel, while often overstated, is in fact a significant component of its foreign policy, but one that can only be understood in terms of other, more important aspects of its strategic outlook. In other words, the paper argues that Iran’s opposition to Israel is a product of the particular circumstances and conditions that have shaped Iran’s post-revolutionary history and its determination to control its role in international affairs.

The Arab-Israeli conflict’s path from 1948-1990 reflected the interplay between internal dynamics and the global Soviet and US perspectives during the Cold War. While Arab-Israeli matters were not the only factor, they do help explain the Soviet and US alliance patterns in the region, and the copious amounts of arms that followed. The superpowers played crucial roles in each Arab-Israeli war from 1948 to 1973; often those roles were deeply destabilizing. The same cannot be said of the peacemaking efforts of the 1970s and 1980s, when Washington largely froze out Moscow's diplomats. US unilateral negotiating handily beat out Soviet multilateral diplomacy. Nonetheless, there were moments of cooperation over the decades, such as in the early recognition of the State of Israel, the shared disappointment at the 1956 Suez War, the definition of the land-for-peace formula (in UNSCR 242) and the mutual recognition that the Palestinian question had a national-political dimension, not just a humanitarian one. As a secondary focus, this paper will also address patterns of superpower interaction with their client states between the wars. (This paper is a draft chapter for the the Cambridge University Press Companion to the Cold War in the Middle East and North Africa.)