This paper deals with the relationships between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority in Israel today. It emphasizes the fact that the analysis of those relationships has been given much less attention than the relationships between Israel and the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. In fact, this issue has been ignored as part of the so-called "Peace Process". The paper will make the claim that in terms of the long-range stability of Israel, majority-minority relations within the state are crucial, and that those relations ought to be discussed within the framework of a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (something that, ironically, not only Israelis but even Palestinians and others are reluctant to do). The paper will emphasize a variety of declaratory, constitutional and policy initiatives that could be taken in order to improve the relations between the majority and the minority, including expansion of the definition of the State, the establishment of cultural and educational autonomy to the minority, and the formal recognition of Arab community as a "national minority". The overall argument of the paper is that a redefinition of Arab-Jewish relations in Israel is essential for both the country's future stability and improvement in the quality of its democracy. The record of the Netanyahu Government in 2009-2010 will be assessed against the backdrop of deteriorating Jewish-Arab relation inside Israel.

Israel, Syria and Lebanon - Towards a New Round of Violence During the last year, since the Lebanese elections of 2009, it became clearer and clearer that Hizballah has emerged as the leading power in this country. For Israel, the conclusions to be drawn from this crisis are clear. The situation created on Israel's northern border in the wake of the recent war and in the shadow of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 is a fragile and shaky one. This being so, Israel has to be concerned that sooner or later Nasrallah will try to restore the situation along the Lebanese-Israeli border to what it was prior to July 12, 2006. In the mean time, Syrian President is sending mixed signals to Israel as for his readiness to resume peace negotiations with the Jewish state. At the same time, he threatens Israel that if peace can not to be achieved, Syria might start a war against Israel to force it to accept the Syrian demands (total Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights). Thus, in this front too, the Israel is preparing itself for a new round of violence.

Three weeks after US President Barak Obama took office, Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu received sufficient votes in the February 10,2009 Israeli elections to begin to put together a right- of -center coalition government, something he had accomplished by 1 April 2009. Almost immediately thereafter there was conflict between Obama and Netanyahu. Obama pushed for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict while, initially, Netanyahu opposed such a solution. Obama also opposed Netanyahu's policy of settlement building on the West Bank, seeing it as an obstacle to peace. On the other hand Netanyahu was strongly opposed to Obama's policy of engagement with Iran, seeing it as an opportunity for the Iranians to procrastinate while further developing their nuclear capabilities. Over the course of the next year and a half, however, there was movement by both sides. Netanyahu agreed to a two state solution in a mid-June 2009 speech at Bar-Ilan University, and also agreed to a partial settlement freeze, although many of his critics, both Israeli and Palestinian, questioned how serious the freeze was. For his part, Obama eased the pressure on Israel's settlement policy, even as he sought to restart peace talks between the Israelis and Palestinians. This paper, which is partially based on interviews at the Israeli Foreign office and at the US State Department, will analyze the reasons for the changes in both Obama's and Netanyahu's policies. It will explore the dynamics--and problems--of Obama's engagement policy; the other foreign policy issues such as Afghanistan and Iraq which increasingly took up Obama's time; the domestic political issues such as health care which also weighed more and more heavily on Obama; and the lack of willingness on the part of the Palestinian Authority to renew peace talks with Israel until it fully stopped settlement construction. It will also explore the constraints on Netanyahu from the right-wing elements of his governing coalition, particularly the religious parties. The paper will conclude with an analysis of the possible impact of an Israeli strike against Iran's nuclear installations on US-Israeli relations. Given that most Israelis have little faith that the US will be able to enact serious sanctions against Iran; or, even if the US gets unexpected support from China and Russia for such sanctions, whether the sanctions will be able to stop the Iranian nuclear enrichment program, Israel is actively considering a strike on the Iranian nuclear installations.