The late Fred Halliday once noticed that ‘there are two predictable, and nearly always mistaken, responses to any great international upheaval: one is to say that everything has changed; the other is to say that nothing has changed.’ The remark serves as a useful reminder in the current debate on the implications of the ‘Arab Uprisings’ for (the study of) Arab politics. Thus, while to some the Arab Uprisings have produced a completely ‘new Middle East’ making our previous theoretical assumptions obsolete, others question this ‘newness’ and see no need for rethinking existing theoretical/analytical approaches. Following Halliday’s point about how both of these reactions are ‘nearly always mistaken’, the purpose of this paper is to explore dimensions of both change and continuity in Arab regional politics and against this background discuss whether a specific analytical framework for regional politics in the preceding decade is still useful. More specifically, the paper revisits the notion about a ‘New Arab Cold War’ - originally presented in the context of the 2006-Summer-War - and relates this framework to the emerging regional configuration. Based on a distinction between changes at an immediate and a more fundamental level the paper identifies on the one hand a number of important shifts in regional dynamics, including the weakening/dissolution of the status-quo/’moderate’ camp and the muqawama/’radical’ camp; Hizballah’s loss of popular support regionally; a growing sectarian dimension to regional politics now reflected in speculations about a ‘Sunni Crescent’; the (initially) marginal role played by the Palestine-conflict and finally the rise to power of representatives of the formerly oppositional ‘societal Islamic Political Arabism’. The paper detects on the other hand some of the same – or similar - distinct features of regional politics visible before 2011, including a high degree of permeability reflected in a complex intertwinement between regional and domestic politics and the existence of Arabist/Islamist trans-national ideologies, which - like before – are most visible within the non-state/societal domain that still bears resemblances with an ‘Arab sound-chamber’. Following a brief comparison with some of the recent suggestions about returning to the ‘old’ Arab Cold War framework of 1950/60 as an analytical lens for grasping the present dynamics in regional politics, the paper suggests that the ‘New Arab Cold War’-framework should not be considered obsolete but might be in need of an ‘upgrade’ and the paper outlines how this can be done.

Qatari Foreign Policy and the Exercise of Subtle Power Qatar is exercising a new form of power that does not conform to our traditional conceptions of “soft,” “hard,” or “smart” power. This new, composite form of power can be best described as “subtle power”. Qatari foreign policy is comprised of four primary components. These include hedging, military security and protection, branding and hyperactive diplomacy, and international investments. Whereas most other Arab states of the Persian Gulf have adopted bandwagoning as their preferred foreign policy approach, Qatar has opted for hedging by placing a big bet one way—positioning itself under the American security umbrella—while placing a number of smaller bets the other way—as in maintaining warm relations with Iran and Hamas. This has enabled the country to maintain open lines of communications with multiple actors, thus uniquely positioning it the crosscurrents of global and especially regional developments. Military security and protection, guaranteed by the United States, has enabled the state to maintain an extremely active diplomatic profile and to engage in risky ventures it would otherwise have abstained from, as in the Libyan and Syrian uprisings, which have only enhanced Qatar’s carefully crafted image as an active member of the international community. Also supporting this image, backed up by an aggressive global branding campaign, have been Qatari mediation efforts as well as the expansive activities and influence of Al Jazeera television channel. Inordinate financial resources have meanwhile turned Qatar into an aggressive global investor both in East Asia and in Western Europe. Combined, these four foreign policy components have bestowed Qatar with a level of power and influence that is far beyond its status as a small state and a newcomer to regional and global politics. This type of power is neither rooted in the attraction of norms (soft power) nor in military ability (hard power). It consists of a form of often behind-the-scenes agenda setting that may best be described as subtle power.

This paper examines Egyptian foreign policy in the wake of the January 25 Revolution. I elaborate on Susan Strange’s notion of ‘structural power’ and explore the ways in which Islamist rule is compatible with the ‘rules of the game’ of Arab foreign policy toward Israel and Palestine, which have since the 1970s centred on security, crisis management and bilateral solutions rather than addressing the root causes of the conflict or proactively addressing ongoing challenges. The paper evaluates the structural constraints on Egyptian foreign policy as well as the role of Islamist ideology as a domestic influence. I contend that a resilient US structural power, combined with a nuanced ideological approach to state power, help explain Egypt’s continued ‘moderation’ in foreign policy despite the revolution. The Brotherhood has long combined pragmatism vis-à-vis the state with idealism or utopianism vis-à-vis society. State power has primarily been seen as necessary to provide the space and security, and legal framework, for the flourishing of Islam in society. Empirically, the paper is based on a review of Muslim Brotherhood ideological approaches to the state and international relations historically, as well as more recent statements and actions of President Morsi and Islamist media commentary, focussing in particular on the period during and after the 2012 Gaza crisis. The Egyptian case, I show, suggests a need to rethink the role of ideology in international relations, in particular the presumed relationship between the norms and values underpinning foreign policy and the ideas binding state with society in the domestic context.