Why are four-fifths of 45 Muslim-majority countries ruled by authoritarian regimes whereas only two-fifths of 193 countries in the world are autocracies? The paper analyzes this puzzle in two parts. The first part critically analyzes three alternative explanations of authoritarianism in Muslim-majority countries based on the a) alleged incompatibility of Islam and secularism, b) subordination of women, and c) difference between Arab and non-Arab Muslim-majority countries. The second part develops my own argument about the impacts of neighborhood effect and oil revenue on authoritarianism in the Muslim world. Neighborhood effects are very important for shifts from authoritarianism to democracy or vice versa as we saw in the examples of a) the rise of fascism before the World War II and democratization in its aftermath in Western Europe, b) the end of the military regimes in the late 1980s in Latin America, and c) the collapse of communism in the early 1990s in Eastern Europe. The paper argues that Muslim-majority countries should be analyzed as multiple geographical regions, rather than a monolithic geographical unit, to understand the high ratio of authoritarianism among them. There are two main regions that include entirely authoritarian Muslim-majority countries. These two regions have produced spillover effects and created vicious cycles of authoritarianism. One is the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The other authoritarian region is Central and Southwest Asia (CSWA). Muslim-majority countries in other parts of the world (Europe, Southeast Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa) include both electoral democracies (9) and autocracies (7), and thus their ratio of democracy (56 %) is almost the same of the world average (62 %). This paper explains why these two regions (MENA and CSWA) authoritarian by combining the effects of neighborhood and oil revenue. In other words, it will bridge the literatures on the impacts of geography and rentier economy. Majority of countries in MENA and CSWA regions are rentier states. Even the non-rentier states are under direct influence of the rentier economy that dominates the region through remittances and foreign debts. Moreover, non-rentier states are affected by the authoritarian mood of their rentier neighbors. In sum, the paper stresses that existence or absence of democracy in Muslim countries is a result of economic and geographic conditions rather than religious characteristics, gender relations, or ethnic identities.

Anti-Americanism is on the rise in the Arab World. A 2007 Pew poll found that majorities in eight Arab countries held unfavorable attitudes towards the US. According to scholars and analysts, the high levels of anti-Americanism across the region derive from two dominant sources--the effects of US policies in the region, and the "clash of values" between the West and the Islamic world. The last decade alone has witnessed numerous wars, a stagnant peace process, and a reversal in political liberalization trajectories across the region. Thus, citizens of the Arab world often attribute their dismal political standing to the interventionist role of the US in the region. Yet, a second group of scholars and analysts have posited fundamental ideological difference at the root of anti-Americanism. Does a clash of values indeed structure the civilizational divide between the two culturest This paper first seeks firmly to ascertain the sources of anti-Americanism in the Arab region by relying on survey data from the Arab Barometer which includes data from seven Arab countries. The paper then examines the ways in which anti-Americanism has influenced patterns of Islamist and democratic political engagement. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion on the potential for democratic gains if anti-Americanism is lessened across Arab states.

Do the attitudes of citizens of Muslim-majority countries stand as an anomaly with regard to the global trend of democratization? How different are the citizens of Muslim countries from the citizens of other non-Western countries, in terms of the factors that propel them to support or refrain from supporting democracy and its fundamental principles? To answer the first question, this paper uses survey data on popular attitudes in thirteen Muslim-majority countries. Addressing the second question, it employs public surveys in six countries as a laboratory. The paper mainly uses the World Value Survey (2006-2008 Wave). Although this dataset has some limitations on the cross-cultural examination of my two research questions, it still includes sufficient number of cases to represent a spectrum of political regimes that ranges from consolidated democracies (USA, Norway, and India) to emerging democracies (Taiwan, Brazil and Ghana). It also provides a variation of non-Arab Muslim countries (Turkey and Indonesia), Arab Muslim countries (Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco), and non-Muslim countries (China and Vietnam). At the more variable-oriented level of analysis, this paper investigates the possible factors that lead citizens of Muslim countries to adopt similar or different values regarding democracy. It also compares public attitudes in these countries with those in a selected group of non-Muslim countries, including the largest consolidated democracy in the world--India. Among the interesting findings of this research is defiance of one-size-fit-all overgeneralizations about the Muslims who are not only different and diverse but they are also different and diverse for different and diverse reasons. Besides, there is evidence that democracy indeed is of global appeal to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Yet there is a clear gap between Muslims and non-Muslims in regards to religious trust and gender equality.

The participation of Islamic political parties in electoral politics is a rather understudied phenomenon for the simple reason that they are often operating in non-competitive political environments. This study aims to make a contribution to our understanding of democratic participation in Muslim societies, the role of Islamist parties in the democratic process, and the trajectories these parties are likely to take in future. Since 1998, Indonesia has had three cycles of democratic elections, in 1999, 2004, and 2009. Malaysia has had a democratic system since obtaining its independence from the British in 1957. The Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) has participated in democratic elections since the early 1960s. In the last three elections, PAS has been a member of the opposition coalition. A leading Indonesian Islamic party, PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera - Prosperous Justice Party) has been a coalition member with President Susilo Bambang's Democratic Party in Indonesia in the last two elections. The paper will answer two broad sets of questions: (1) what adjustments an Islamic party makes as a response to electoral resultst; and (2) what kind of demands and concessions Islamic parties make as a result of participating in coalition politics? Theoretical literature on elections and coalition politics suggests that an ideology-driven political party, such as PKS or PAS, would not sacrifice its ideological stance for the sake of electoral success. On the other hand, such a party would be more willing to alter its ideological posture in order to become a member of a political coalition. The proposed study plans to test this theoretical background against the two case studies of PKS and PAS. The study will include the PKS' and PAS' performance in the last three Indonesian and Malaysian elections (1999, 2004, and 2009). Specifically, I will attempt at answering the following questions: (1) how do PKS and PAS respond to electoral results (the implications of success and failure)?; (2) do they make demands or concessions prior to entering coalition politics?; (3) how do they behave once they enter coalitionsi (how they negotiate?; are they flexible in their demands?); and (4) does participation in coalition politics has a moderating or hardening effect on their ideology? The paper is based on archival research and personal interviews with leading members of PAS and PKS, both of which are conducted in the summers of 2009 and 2010 (planned).