This paper analyzes and compares two political generations of Lebanese Shi‘i intellectual-activists, each of whom developed a shared consciousness and came together to mobilize as an active force for political change. Analyzing early party documents, along with speeches and writings of some of the central figures, I distinguish a generation that emerges with the Da‘wa party in Iraq in the late 1950s-1960s and a Hizbullah generation that emerges in the late 1970s-1980s. I examine the social and political conditions that contributed to each generation’s emergence and analyze the political thinking they came to articulate, with the aim of accounting for the differences and changes between generations. The first generation emerges from the hawza of Najaf and consists of figures who, along with the Iraqi intellectual Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, were involved in the formation of the first revolutionary Shi‘i Islamist party, Hizb al-Da‘wa al-Islamiyya. I focus my analysis on Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, who headed Lebanon’s Higher Islamic Shi‘i Council after Musa al-Sadr’s disappearance, and Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, who was central in founding of Lebanon’s Da‘wa party and arguably the most important Shi'i intellectual until his recent death. Scholarship focusing on the early history of the Da‘wa has invariably focused on the attempt to curb the loss of Shi’i youth to communist and other secular parties. I demonstrate that what distinguishes this generation is not only their formulation of an alternative to secular ideologies, but the way in which their intellectual project was shaped by that challenge, as they translated some of the issues and rhetoric of these ideologies into Islamic categories. The second generation gains their political consciousness was formed amidst the Israeli invasions of Lebanon and the Islamic revolution in Iran. My analysis focuses chiefly on the past and present secretary generals of Hizbullah, Abbas al-Musawi and Hasan Nasrallah. Although both studied in Najaf, their time at the hawza was cut short by Iraqi government repression. Where the Da‘wa generation was concerned with the task of formulating a Shi‘i Islamist worldview, this generation displays a preference for direct action over intellectual work. I demonstrate that the difference between generations lies as much in the ways in the Hizbullah generation takes up and engages concerns and issues different than those of the Da‘wa generation as it does in any specific ways in which the former is influenced by or rejects the thought of the latter.

This paper studies the construction and transformation of an Islamic discourse of empowerment that Shi‘i religious activists spread in Shi‘i communities during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Current scholarly treatment of Hizbullah describes the movement as a product of the Iranian revolution, a military organization, or an historical accident. This paper takes a fresh look at the development of modern Shi‘i religious activism in Lebanon. Based on the data gleaned from early speeches and writings of activist clerics and students from the Lebanese Shi‘i community, the paper provides a twofold argument. First key factors and individuals –not necessarily related to Khumayni’s circle– contributed to Hizbullah’s rise in 1982. Second the paper demonstrates that by analyzing the intellectual career and historical background of these key figures and groups, one may explain Hizbullah’s ability to reconcile and shift between revolutionary and gradualist approaches to social and political practice in Lebanon. The first part of the paper analyzes the writings and speeches of the prominent Shi‘i scholar Muhammad Husayn Fadlullah and his close circle of students and Da‘wa party comrades. In addition, through examination of Shi‘i religious sites in Lebanon, the paper explores how these activists spread their religious views and practices and attracted the Lebanese Shi‘i community in the late 1970s. The paper argues that these groups played a major role in nurturing a strong religious consciousness and discourse of empowerment in the Lebanese Shi‘i community in which the cadres of what became Hizbullah resided. In the second part, locating the shifts in the writings, speeches, and manifestations of religiosity, the paper shows how, in combination with events like the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, religious activists gradually incorporated the ideology and discourse of the revolutionary circle of Khumayni into their Islamic environment. The paper argues that the quick transformations of the Lebanese Shi‘i community’s religious consciousness and environment led to a dual natured Hizbullah discourse of empowerment as a result of a confluence of two different paradigms of Shi‘i political Islam, one coming from Iraq, and the other from Iran.

The Shiites are the single largest religious group in Lebanon, estimated to be around 45% of the general population of the country. The reputation of the Lebanese Hizbullah is such that, to the casual observer, it looks as if the group monopolizes Shiite representation in Lebanon. It is a leader of the community as it represents an estimated 90%. However, it is out of step with parts of the community (especially the middle class) who are tired of the role that Hizbullah has played in the destruction of their communities. Indeed members of the Shiite community began to reject Hizbullah’s actions in summer 2006 and in May 2008, and are increasingly speaking out against the party and Hassan Nasrallah’s unilateral decisions which affect the entire community. This emerging movement currently has a limited constituency. However, it is a likely source of political change and diversification in the Shi`a community. This intra-Shiite opposition movement manifests itself in the reemergence of traditional political families and of the religious aristocracy. Shi`a secular and religious leaders that are unaffiliated with either Amal or Hizbullah are trying to play a role on the political scene. They have so far been unsuccessful at the parliamentary level, but the 2010 municipal elections showed that the Hizbullah-Amal electoral lists were successfully penetrated by independents. Following the 2006 war, Sayyed Ali al-Amin, then the Mufti of Tyre and Jabel Amel, has emerged as a leading voice in this budding movement: Al-Amine questioned the right of Hizbullah to bring disaster on the Shiites of Lebanon. He had been close to Hizbullah so his distancing from the organization was notable and his critique of the party led to his removal from office as Mufti. He has nevertheless continued his critique and has written and lectured extensively about issues such as taqrib (rapprochement) with the Sunnis, citizenship, allegiance to a nation-state and relations with Iran. His critique of what he terms “religious parties” can be seen as an attack on Hizbullah. This paper will unpack Al-Amine’s views on citizenship and relations with Iran while showing how these views reflect his perception of Hizbullah. The paper will also trace the intellectual lineage of his work to the writings of the late Lebanese Ayatollahs Fadlallah and Shams al-Din.