Gender has provided a key analytical tool to understand questions of nation and class in the history of the modern Middle East. The debate on modernization initiated by the Tanzimat reforms (1839-1876) ultimately begged the question of women's place in Ottoman society. As the family came to be conceived of as "the nation's" basic unit, the role of the wife and mother was scrutinized. Women were conceived as carriers of civilization, whose significance was their ability to educate and discipline the future leaders and individuals of the nation. Hence, women's increased presence came to symbolize reforms associated with modernization and westernization. While reforms were first felt in the imperial center, it was not until the early twentieth century that Syrian women began to feel the effects of these changes through the expansion of state schools and those run by charitable foundations. Looking at the writings of the nahda, or literary renaissance, initiated by bourgeois Syrian intellectuals in the nineteenth century shows how the issues of gender and nation were linked in discourses of the modern period. Women activists came to frame their responsibilities in the language of national progress. This paper looks at Mary 'Ajami's early twentieth century Damascene women's magazine, al-'Arus (The Bride). Mary 'Ajami, one of Syria's leading women writers and activists, gathered support and readership for this monthly from within Syria and from emigrants abroad. This paper situates the periodical within a broader background surrounding gender, nationalism, and class in early twentieth century Syria. Published in 1910 till 1926, the publication spanned Ottoman, Arab and French rule. Since the periodical temporarily halted publication during the First World War, this paper looks at the issues 1914, 1919, 1920 and 1921. My analysis of the periodical reveals a shift in rhetoric and content which accompanied the changing political landscape. This paper will argue that as the effects of the state became more defined, individuals were better able to conceive of their place within the public sphere. The periodical's issues just before the war reveal oft repeated themes concerning self-improvement and sociability; when bringing up issues of wataniyah, the magazine's rhetoric was often metaphorical. After the war, especially during the brief reign of Amir Faysal in 1920, the content and language of the magazine is much more concrete with regards to women's concerns and imagined role within state and society.

What happens to the classification of the peasantry as a subaltern group in a country where the president - presumably the most powerful man -declares that he is a "peasant and the son of a peasant"a This declaration by Syria's longest ruler in the 20th century, Hafez Al Asad, reflects two fundamental aspects of the literature on Syria's modern history. The first is that the history of 20th Syria -the history of its anti-colonial struggle, the rise of nationalism among its populace, and the founding and building of its state - is, as depicted in the historiography, intimately intertwined with the history of its peasantry. The second fact is that this history poses a serious challenge to the notion of the peasantry - in general terms - as a subaltern group. In this paper, I critically examine the way the peasantry of 20th century Syria has been represented in the historiography. I ask the following questions: How do historians of Syria depict the peasantry (both men and women peasants) and what role do they allot to them in the making of history of the countryo In other words, based on the historiography alone, are we able to construct a coherent narrative of the peasant, as a collective and an individual Or are there multiple narratives that occasionally converge but often don'tg Based on these depictions, do the peasants emerge as dominant subjects of history, and if they do, what type of agency are they allotted (rebellious, conservative, masculine)e I pose these questions in relation to pre-eminent works about Syria's peasantry, namely those of Hanna Batatu, Raymond Hinnebusch, and Abdallah Hanna. Other secondary works, including those by Michael Provence and Perthes Volker, are also examined.

The Syrian project to establish a form of "official Islam" has been contested at various times. A well known case is the challenge from the Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1970s and beginning of 1980s. Since the Brotherhood was suppressed in the early 1980s the government has endeavored to co-opt Islam and create an "official Islam" in which to channel pious citizens. Moreover, since the 1980s representatives within the framework of "official Islam" have been given the possibility to establish movements and organizations. Operating in a space in which the state is weak, if not absent. These organizations have developed in to self-maintained structures containing various forms of education, charity and sometimes a large economy. Hence, communities parallel to the state founded on specific interpretations of Islam have appeared in the society. For several reasons the government recently began to feel threatened by these "private" religious movements and a governmental decree was issued in 2008 to take control of the organizations. The decree was implemented in 2009 and now most, if not all, of the "private" religious movements are under the control of the Ministry of Religion. The most well known representative of "official Islam" today is the Ahmad Kuftaro Foundation. In 1938 Kuftaro inherited the position as a shaykh of a Naqshbandi branch and in 1964 he became the mufti of Syria. In 2004 this charismatic shaykh passed away and today the organization, centered at the Abu Nur mosque in Damascus, is headed by one of the mufti's sons, Salah Kuftaro. Throughout the years it has been seen as an exponent of "official Islam" in Syria. However, the current-day development of the organization is challenged and its contemporary leader, Salah Kuftaro was placed in jail in June 2009. This paper will explore how and why an "official Islam" employed by the Syrian state turned into something that was apparently perceived as dangerous by the same state. Hence, I will analyze the fundamental aspects of the Kuftaro foundation, especially its mission to develop an Islamic model for the society. This message is designated to present a functionally useful interpretation of Islam that enables followers to succeed in a setting influenced by modernity as well as other interpretations of Islam. This paper is founded on extensive fieldwork in Damascus and the analysis is based on a sociological approach in which Islam is seen as a social force intimately connected with society.

In 2000, there were four universities in Syria; while all public and free, they enrolled just 12% of 18-23 year olds. Today, there are 19 universities in Syria and approximately 21.7% of the age cohort is enrolled in university (UIS 2009). This expanded access to higher education, a process known as massification, is the result of explicit and ambitious reforms taken by the Syrian government to introduce competition and expand higher education to wider segments of the population (Risheh 2006). Syria's higher education reforms are being framed as an essential component of Syria's larger economic transition from a centrally planned economy to a social market economy. Despite the widespread consensus that the transition towards a knowledge economy is necessary for Syria's economic vitality (IMF 2006; Sottimano and Selvik 2009), the changing role of the university reflects a larger and more fundamental change concerning the role of the state in its citizens' lives. Yet, there is still very little understanding of how recent reforms to expand and privatize higher education are altering young people's perceptions of their educational and employment opportunities in Syria. Based on interview research conducted with 25 young Syrian youth aged 18-31 in summer 2009, this paper will examine how the massification of higher education in Syria is altering young people's experiences of higher education and their perceptions of the opportunity structure. The paper argues that Syria's traditional university system was one of high standardization and high stratification, which acted to doubly sort students -- first into secondary tracks and again into university programs -- leading to an inflexible university system and a rigid rank-order of careers in the labor market. Based on interview findings, I argue that while objective opportunities for both education and private sector employment may be expanding in Syria, youths' subjective perceptions of educational and employment opportunities are not as optimistic, for a number of reasons. First, while today's youth are extremely ambitious, access to higher education no longer promises the secure position in the state sector that it once did. Second, while the recent reforms have been successful at introducing diverse new tertiary education providers and decreasing the rigidity of student sorting, it is perhaps only those with the means to pay who can benefit. Lastly, institutional, family, and cultural pressures still limit young people's educational and employment options, frequently directing them into majors and careers for which they have little interest.

Shaykh Abu Hassan calls himself a 'spiritual doctor.' He says he can heal infertility, obesity and unofficially performs 'love magic' and exorcism. Because he doesn't engage in 'black magic' (i.e. he doesn't intentionally harm anyone), he claims that his work is Islamically permissible and even describes his craft as an 'Islamic science.' He substantiates the existence and power of magic and jinn by quoting the Qur'an. Moreover, he recites Qur'anic verses and appeals to the twelve Imams when performing 'spiritual labor' for his clients. For this paper, I examine precisely how the shaykh's legitimacy and authority are represented and negotiated. I posit that the shaykh's specific kind of heterodoxy is enabled by the peculiarity of the space in which he operates. Though the shaykh himself is an Iraqi Twelver Shi'i from Baghdad, he had been living and working in Sayyida Zaynab, Syria, for just over two years when I conducted fieldwork there in the fall of 2009. While Twelver Shi'ism constitutes a small minority in Syria, Sayyida Zaynab is an exception. The shrine-town of Sayyida Zaynab, the granddaughter of Prophet Muhammad, is peripheral both socially and religiously: The shrine-town is a recently established center of Shi'i learning and pilgrimage and thus, it attracts students and visitors from Iran, Afghanistan, the Arabian Gulf and South Asia. However, the town has also served as a refugee camp for Palestinians, displaced Syrians from the Golan Heights and more recently, Iraqis. Similar to the shrine-town's overall population, the shaykh's customers are a mixed crowd. They include Syrians, Palestinians, Iraqis and Gulf Arabs, Twelver Shi'is, Sunnis and even Christians. Interestingly, the overwhelming majority of those who seek his help are women: young women, older women, Shi'i seminary students and even Sunni housewives. Based on extensive fieldwork in Sayyida Zaynab, this paper draws not only on ethnographic examples of shaykh Abu Hassan's performances, but also demonstrates how otherwise 'orthodox' women appropriate heterodox, magical practices on the periphery. Thereby, it also analyzes the relationships between the center and the periphery, Islamic orthodoxy and popular heterodoxy (including questions of 'orthopraxy' and 'heteropraxy'), and a Shi'i spiritual doctor's claim to religious authority and legitimacy.