Algeria was the second country to erupt briefly in the wave of Arab uprisings leading most experts to expect that it would be next in undergoing a major uprising, as the country presented (and still does) similar characteristics: corruption, nepotism, deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, restricted freedoms, and bad governance. To rebuke the opposition, the regime argues that Algeria went through its own spring in 1988 and now has a democratic system immune to revolution. The cosmetic reforms the regime introduced after the 1988 riots and those after the bloody decade have allegedly meant to put Algeria on a new path of democracy and development. But, such expectations proved illusory as the political system has regenerated itself thanks to a considerable rise in oil prices, main source of revenue. The civil wars in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, and the uncertainties of the transitions in Egypt and Tunisia have so far dissuaded Algerians from revolting. In February 2016, the regime passed a new constitution supposed to crown the various reforms. However, Algeria today boasts a despotic regime with a façade of semi-democracy. And, the high price of hydrocarbons that had enabled it to buy social peace has dwindled, resulting in increasing hardship except for a privileged, corrupt class linked to the regime. In reviewing the 55 years of political and socioeconomic developments since independence, using the concepts of Political Economy and studies in authoritarianism, I will analyze the major stratagems that the regime has used to reinvent itself and to stem genuine change. The major question addressed is whether the current conditions are sustainable and whether the regime can survive another major uprising in the making. The analysis will use studies on the Rentier State and its robustness and the “new authoritarianism” and illiberal democracies theses; this study is especially relevant since five years after the riots in early 2011, Algeria’s socioeconomic and political conditions are strangely reminiscent of those that trigged the 1988 events. The paper will draw from long-time research and numerous field-trips to Algeria, countless interviews with officials, journalists, academics, protesters, political activists, opposition party leaders, and leading Maghreb scholars. Positing a number of hypotheses, this paper will seek to demonstrate that the Algerian war of liberation has failed in delivering its promises for a post-colonial democratic, modern polity and examines whether Algeria might be on the brink of a social revolution, peaceful or otherwise.