Algeria was the second country to erupt briefly in the wave of Arab uprisings leading most experts to expect that it would be next in undergoing a major uprising, as the country presented (and still does) similar characteristics: corruption, nepotism, deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, restricted freedoms, and bad governance. To rebuke the opposition, the regime argues that Algeria went through its own spring in 1988 and now has a democratic system immune to revolution. The cosmetic reforms the regime introduced after the 1988 riots and those after the bloody decade have allegedly meant to put Algeria on a new path of democracy and development. But, such expectations proved illusory as the political system has regenerated itself thanks to a considerable rise in oil prices, main source of revenue. The civil wars in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, and the uncertainties of the transitions in Egypt and Tunisia have so far dissuaded Algerians from revolting. In February 2016, the regime passed a new constitution supposed to crown the various reforms. However, Algeria today boasts a despotic regime with a façade of semi-democracy. And, the high price of hydrocarbons that had enabled it to buy social peace has dwindled, resulting in increasing hardship except for a privileged, corrupt class linked to the regime. In reviewing the 55 years of political and socioeconomic developments since independence, using the concepts of Political Economy and studies in authoritarianism, I will analyze the major stratagems that the regime has used to reinvent itself and to stem genuine change. The major question addressed is whether the current conditions are sustainable and whether the regime can survive another major uprising in the making. The analysis will use studies on the Rentier State and its robustness and the “new authoritarianism” and illiberal democracies theses; this study is especially relevant since five years after the riots in early 2011, Algeria’s socioeconomic and political conditions are strangely reminiscent of those that trigged the 1988 events. The paper will draw from long-time research and numerous field-trips to Algeria, countless interviews with officials, journalists, academics, protesters, political activists, opposition party leaders, and leading Maghreb scholars. Positing a number of hypotheses, this paper will seek to demonstrate that the Algerian war of liberation has failed in delivering its promises for a post-colonial democratic, modern polity and examines whether Algeria might be on the brink of a social revolution, peaceful or otherwise.

Morocco is heralded nowadays as a unique case of a country with long term stability and gradual reforms, including human rights improvements and constitutional changes aimed at giving more authority to elected institutions while curtailing somewhat the authority of the monarchy and the informal state powers known collectively as the Makkhzen. The government has been led since 2011 by an Islamist party, the Party of Justice and Development (PJD), which remains very popular. Such popularity seems to stem more from its ability to effect small changes in key areas, such as the judiciary. In spite of institutional limitations imposed on all elected offices, including the prime minister, the PJD leadership has not sought to challenge the powers of the monarch and the Makhzen. Even after the constitutional reforms of 2011 and the political integration of Islamists, the Moroccan polity remains constrained by a modus operandi that accepts the supremacy of the monarchy, allows both a formal government led by elected officials and a shadow government serving the king. This is far from the constitutionalism demanded by the mass demonstrations of 2011, while the socio-economic remain unchanged for the masses. This paper will examine the evolution of Morocco’s political reforms since the Arab spring protests of 2011 with the aim of testing propositions of both the liberal and “illiberal democracy” literature and the extent to which they helps understand the nature and limits of recent and future reforms. More specifically, it will look into 1) how much liberalism and democracy Morocco has attained since the current monarch assumed power; 2) the extent to which, Morocco is, and will remain, an “illiberal democracy” as long as the fundamentals of monarchy-state-society remain unchanged. It will be argued that Morocco’s ability to remain a country of exceptional peace and stability in a region in turmoil rests mainly on an agreed upon modus operandi that eschews both Western liberalism and democracy. Rather than endangering the regime, such limitation maintains it. This paper will draw on democracy and liberalism debates and the writings they generated on their usefulness and applicability in a non-western context. Field research in Morocco, including a dozen interviews with secular and religious activists, party and labor leaders, will help establish a set of variables needed for a parsimonious examination of the questions posed here, which will be included in a future regional large N study that is both qualitative and quantitative.

This paper embeds a textured, ethnographic study of Nahdaoui (Ennahda party supporting) youth – drawing on four years of fieldwork – within a broader analysis of generational tensions in Tunisian politics. Ennahda leaders’ efforts to rethink Islamism as a national, long-termist project of al-siyasa al-intiqaliya (transitional politics) predicated on compromise, cultural conservatism, and the survival of a democratic (if not necessarily secular-liberal) political system, has not translated fully to its base – particularly the young. While middle-aged and older Nahdaouis have experienced difficulty coming to terms with power-sharing political compromises, younger Nahdaouis – whom I define as individuals aged 35 and younger – have had trouble accepting the leadership’s malleable messaging, and most importantly concessions on ‘classically Islamist’ issues, most notably the inclusion of “sharia” in Tunisia’s 2014 constitution. (Ghannouchi famously said that lack of agreement over what sharia means and negative experiences in places like Afghanistan meant that it should not be referenced in the constitution.) This paper examines six interrelated questions. Why have young Nahdaouis been less willing to compromise on religiously oriented issues than their elders? How does Ennahda’s educational program differ from that of other Ikhwani (brotherhood)-oriented Islamist groups? What sorts of young people are more likely to be promoted through Ennahda’s ranks, and why? How much influence do young people wield on Ennahda’s Shura (Consultative) Council and in regional and municipal representative bodies? What steps has Ennahda taken to expand its base of youth support? Are Tunisia’s young Islamists trapped between a gerontocracy led by political “dinosaurs” and the “dragons” of criminality and extremism, or is the reality more nuanced? Answers to these are questions draw on hundreds of interviews conducted with Ennahda members – especially young, local activists – across Tunisia between 2011 to 2016. The second half of the paper explores how these Islamist intra-party patterns map onto broader dynamics of youth religiosity and political participation shared across political parties and even trade unions and civil society organizations. In this section, I explain how a burgeoning Salafi ‘Almi (quietist, predicatory Salafist) trend in the 2000s represented historic competition for Ennahda, with lasting affects on its youth support. Engaging with literature on Islamism, including the Islamist inclusions/exclusion thesis, modernization, and political sociology, the paper explores how centralization, regional marginalization, and gerontocratic hierarchy – dynamics broadly shared across Tunisian parties and civil society organizations – compare in other political and social movements vis-à-vis Ennahda, and why these trends matter for youth inclusion or exclusion.

How to account for the collapse of the Libyan state? Despite the impressive displays of national unity in the 2011 uprising and the elections of 2012, no force has been able to consolidate power in post-revolutionary Libya. Indeed, almost the opposite seems to be the case: there are as many forces haphazardly pulling Libya apart as there are those ostensibly seeking to keep things together. These contradictory forces — domestic, foreign, and hybrids of the two — are struggling to create the institutions of a modern state in a context shaped by several parameters. There are the reconstituted notions of political legitimacy in the wake of the 2011 revolution, notions that involve violence, sacrifice, and the ever-vigilant defense of the polity against corrupt centralized authority. There are also the legacies of the prior apparatus (the Jamahiriyyah), including its major and minor agents, its structures, its ideational effects, and its long-exploited vulnerabilities. And, lastly, there are the social and economic bases that, first, engendered the rapid and effective formation of anti-regime militias in 2011. These bases, secondly, have since come to serve as means through which power has been radically democratized and maintained in the hands of localities and their armed defenders, the militias. To understand the emergence of these new institutional forms, revolutionary ideals, and violent practices requires an honest analysis of Gaddafi Jamahiriyyah and its evolution in several shifting geo-political and geo-economic environments. What this analysis reveals is the emergence of a strange new polity, one that exhibits telling characteristics of the Jamahiriyyah in its desperate and violent attempts to destroy its vestiges. Based on fieldwork conducted in post-revolutionary Libya and a critical re-reading of existing theorizations of the Libyan polity, this intervention will suggest pathways to a more robust account of the power struggles shaping Libya today.