In November 1854, Egypt’s viceroy issued a firman (decree) granting Ferdinand De Lesseps the exclusive right to form a universal company to construct the Suez Canal. A year later, an “international scientific commission” was formed to assess the “practicability and utility” of constructing the projected canal. The commission’s report was first published in January 1857. In addition to ascertaining the project’s feasibility, it determined the canal’s best route, its optimal dimensions, the best means of excavation, the projected costs, and identified the measures necessary to ensure the project’s profitability. In its immediate aftermath, the viceroy issued both a second, more elaborate firman, elaborating on the rights and obligations stipulated by the first, and a memorandum confirming his government’s commitment to provide the company with the workforce necessary for the project execution. My paper investigates the workings of this commission, and the report it produced. It addresses three main themes. First is the emergence of engineering and finance as criteria for settling the disputes around the canal’s practicability, utility, and route. In the months preceding the establishment of the commission, opposition to the constructing the canal, and to establishing the company, came from the British government, the Société d'études de l'isthme de Suez, and the Ottoman Porte. The reasons they offered for opposing the project were concerns over the French control over Egypt, the British monopoly over the Cape of Good Hope, the project’s possible contribution to Egyptian autonomy, its implications on the interests of British merchants in Alexandria, and the dispute over project ownership. Towards the end of 1855, however, both the British government and the Société expressed their opposition to the project in scientific terms, questioning its practicability, utility and choice of route. I scrutinize this year long negotiation which resulted in the rise of science as a universally accepted language for determining the project’s fate. Second, I study the labors of the commission which resulted in the publication of its report. I focus on the ‘framing’ of questions, which led to discarding the indirect route (proposed by the Société). Finally, I trace the implications of the report on the different parties involved in the project. Among other things, the report provided the ‘scientific’ justification for the conscription of Egyptian laborers to excavate the desert; laid the grounds for establishing the company in France; and offered an outline for the company’s finances.