After experiencing apparent national cohesion during the uprising, numerous tensions emerged within Tunisian society. The success of an-Nahda and the appearance of Salafist militants have raised basic questions, such as the nature of Tunisian identity. The previous consensus on a reformist heritage (Hibou 2006) weakened. While social order was formerly guaranteed by a combination of cooptation, paternalistic redistribution of resources, and oppressive methods, physical confrontations occurred occasionally after the collapse of the regime. The fall of President Ben Ali has in fact swept away the usual means of regulating social conflicts (Harling 2012). Even in the absence of ethnic and religious minorities, the political transition features rising polarizations. Heated debates and persistent demonstrations reveal opposing factions on the ground: Islamists vs. secularists, Arabic-speakers vs. French-speakers, centre vs. periphery (or coast vs. inland, cities vs. countryside). History is often evoked as a legitimizing reference. These antagonisms mirror a gap between a Western-educated elite and the mass ascribable to the modern era and colonial legacies. Similar tendencies manifested themselves within the Tunisian national movement, when the “pragmatic, moderate and progressive” Habib Bourguiba, native of the Sahel, was countered by the radical Salah Ben Youssef from Djerba who adopted Islamic and Arab identity as rallying cries. The paper aims to analyze in a historical perspective the above territorial and cultural cleavages. The party system is a privileged source of analysis as it reflects the conflict-integration dynamic (Lipset, Rokkan 1990). Thus special attention will be paid to the 2011 electoral competition and the governmental coalition (an-Nahda–Congress for the Republic Party–Democratic Forum for Labour and Liberties). An attempt to address all the country through a nationwide network is combined, in al-Nahda’s approach, with an emphasis on morality and religion. The other parties have instead local bases, especially in the capital (the Left) or the peripheral Western region (Al-Aridha whose leader is from Sidi Bouzid). The online press will be also taken into account in order to monitor the different stances. Citizens and intellectuals in particular, in their new role of watchdogs, voice increasingly their opinions and grievances. Discussions over the Family Code of 1956, religious behaviour in public space (i.e. the niq?b at the university) and the place of Arabic language are particularly significant.

Sunni Political Parties in Postwar Lebanon An intriguing feature of post-war Lebanese politics is that the Sunni community is the only major sectarian group that did not end up with a representative party comprised of former militia leaders. Indeed, most of the Sunni militias that existed on the eve of the civil war or that emerged during its first five years (e.g., al-Mourabitoun) had effectively disappeared by the mid-1980s. The absence of a militia leader who would act as a protector of the Sunni community can be in part explained by the role taken by Palestinian forces in Sunni protection during the civil war. Most Lebanese Sunnis were ambivalent in their support of a distinct, multi-confessional Lebanese state, and were sympathetic to the Palestinian exiles, who shared their religious affiliation. Instead of developing independent Lebanese leaders, they rallied behind Yasser Arafat and the PLO. A second factor contributing to the non-emergence of a Sunni party based on a wartime militia is Syrian opposition. Fearing that a powerful Sunni militia in Lebanon might have a spillover effect and encourage Syrian Sunnis to rise up against the Alawite regime, Syria’s leaders actively (and violently) discouraged the development of any such organization during the civil war. In the years immediately following the civil war, two notable Islamist movements gained in popularity among Lebanon’s Sunni community. The first was the Jama`a Islamiyya, the Islamic Group, an organization strongly influenced by Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, and the second was the Jami`yat al-Mashari` al-Khairiyah or the Association of Islamic Charitable Projects, (known as al-Ahbash or the Ethiopians). While these organizations did not have a great impact on the Lebanese political scene, they became a recognizable part of the national discourse and thus merit a brief examination. The post-war period also saw the emergence of the vigorous, Sunni-dominated “Future Movement,” created initially by businessman Rafiq Hariri and then cultivated by his son Saad after the elder Hariri’s assassination in 2005. This paper will discuss the role played by the two Islamist parties in the early 1990s, and will analyze the rise of the “Future Movement” and the role it played in Lebanese politics in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

In what ways does the institutional structure of an Islamic political movement affect its political trajectory? This paper attempts to answer this question by comparing Islamic movements oriented towards proselytization with other Islamic movements oriented towards political representation and interest aggregation. The paper, through a comparative analysis of Islamic movements in Turkey, Egypt and Tunisia, argues that those Islamic movements that prioritize proselytization over political representation differ from other Islamic movements with respect to their ideological flexibility and adaptability to democratic principles. The data is collected through interviews and analysis of official documents of the movements.